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"To

give a man power over his property after his death is very

considerable, but it is nothing [compared] to an extension of this power
to the end of the world."
Adam Smith'
INTRODUCTION

The problem of the dead hand, and of the Rule against Perpetuities that
restrains it, seems historically to have occasioned more frustration than
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1. ADAM SMITH, LECTU ES ON JURISPRUDENCE 467 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (ms.
1762-66).
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reflection. 2 The extent to which society should permit testators to control
both the present and future disposition of their wealth has warmed the
scholarly imagination only intermittently. But after a twenty-year lull,
interest in the problem is on the rise. The publication of two new model
Rules against Perpetuities in the last decade' has sparked a debate reminiscent of the salad days of perpetuities4 reform, when the inimitable W. Barton
Leach gleefully took on all comers.
2. In the nineteenth century, Lord Hobhouse despaired that the topic had often "proved
to be interesting only to a few experts." ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND at v (London,
Chatto & Windus 1880). In the twentieth century, Professor Leach complained that he had to
"ham up" his commentaries on the subject "to get people to read them and thus attract
attention to the problem." W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124, 1152 (1960). Despite Leach's best efforts, the Restaters concluded
that the public policy of the Rule against Perpetuities "has never been adequately explored
and has been seldom discussed." REsTATE ENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
8 (1983). At the same time, the fiendishly difficult calculus of the rule is a matter of legend;
Dean Gulliver captured the feelings of many when he Temarked that the word "vest" as used
in perpetuities analysis "has a rare capacity for engendering other four-letter words." AsHEEL

G.

GULUVER, CASEs AND MATERALS ON THE LAW OF FUruRE IRsTs

3 (Erwin N. Griswold

ed., 1959). Professor Gray, who mastered the rule's calculus more 'thoroughly than any of his
contemporaries, nonetheless agreed that "[t]he study and practice of... perpetuities is indeed
a constant school of modesty." JOHN C. GRAY, Tn RULE AoAiNsT PERPEaurrms at xi (Roland
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942) (1886); see also John W. Weaver, Fear and Loathing in Perpetuities,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1393 (1991). One cannot but wonder whether the frustration and
the inattention are subconsciously connected. Professor Simes found attorneys' reactions to
the rule similar to that of "the small schoolboy [who] is said proverbially to hope that the
school house will burn down." LEw-s M. SIsuS, PuBIc PoucY AND THE DEA HND 53
(1955).
3. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATWE TNsFERs § 1 (1983); UzNF. STAT.
R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8A U.L.A. 342 (Supp. 1992).
4. See Leach, supra note 2, for an example of the wickedly entertaining power of his
pen. The current debate is dominated by a running colloquy between Professors Jesse
Dukeminier and Lawrence Waggoner. For the salvos to date, see Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Perpetuities Reform, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1718 (1983); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The
Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A
Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1714 (1985); Jesse Dukeminier, A Response
By Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1730 (1985); Lawrence W. Waggoner, A
Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1739 (1985); Jesse Dukeminier, A Final
Comment By ProfessorDukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1742 (1985); Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Perpetuities:A ProgressReport on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 20
U. MIAMI INST. ON EsT. PLAN. ch. 7 (1986); Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities,
74 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1986) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Guide]; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986); Jesse
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Uniform Rule]; Lawrence W. Waggoner,
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting
Period,73 CORELL L. REV. 157 (1988). See also, e.g., Ira M. Bloom, PerpetuitiesRefinement:
There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REv. 23 (1987); James S. Chase, Perpetuity Reform:
How Much Do We Need?, 11 PROB. L.J. 1 (1992); Mary L. Fellows, Testing Perpetuities
Reforms: A Study of PerpetuitiesCases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991);
Robert L. Fletcher, Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63 WASH. L. REv. 791
(1988); David S. King & Alexander M. Meiklejohn, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities: Wait-and-See for 90 Years, 17 EsT. PLAN. 24 (1990). Other recent discussions
will appear hereinafter.
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THE DEAD HAND

Our purpose is not to leap into the current fray, which has mainly
concerned the proper framework of "wait-and-see" legislation. This and
other technical matters we intend to sidestep entirely. Our aim, rather, is
to draw back from the fine details of perpetuities reform (amidst which one
is easily mired) and revisit the underlying themes of future interests law
itself. It is the deeper structure of the problem of intergenerational gratuities
that we intend to probe here. s In the glare of recent statutory flourishes,
that structure has received less attention than it ought. Yet, as any architect
knows, foundations matter-even more than facades.
When contemplating future interests at a structural level, scholars and
lawmakers alike have tended to focus on issues of duration: how long
should the dead hand 6 retain its grip? Or, to put the question more literally,
how long should living persons continue to respect (as a matter of right)
the wishes of those who have predeceased them and who have accordingly
lost (as a matter of power) the opportunity to control property for themselves? In response, some thinkers have taken the extreme position that
because the dead have ceased to be, they deserve no deference whatsoever:
control over property is for the living, not the dead. 7 Others have gravitated
to the opposite extreme, asserting, in an argument presently associated with
neo-libertarianism, that the right to consume property while alive carries
with it by necessary implication an absolute right to control it forever.8 Still
other theorists have sought to chart a via media between these two outer
limits. In the leading modem treatise on the policy of the dead hand,

5. Of course, in the process of distancing oneself from technical details, one runs the risk
of losing touch with happenings in the real world. We take to heart Hobbes's (playful) warning
that "the priviledge of Absurdity" belongs to "no living creature ... but man onely. And of
men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy." THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN
113 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651). For a recent gasp of exasperation at the otherworldliness of Critical Legal Studies, see Lea Brilmayer, Response, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REa. 477,
483 (1987). Nonetheless, it remains our hope and conviction that one can attain a stable orbit
between the client conference room and the emptiness of outer space.
6. The analysis here will focus on testamentary transfers. Cognate problems also arise in
connection with inter vivos gifts; the problems tend to merge, in that the living hand that
clings too long will eventually become a dead one.
7. This argument was featured in the writings of various European and American republican theorists and led some to propose either mandatory rules of succession or the abolition
of inheritance. Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1977). For a recent discussion, see Mark L. Ascher,
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L, REv. 69, 76-84 (1990). See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIA JUSTICE IN Tm LIBERAL STATE 201-07 (1980) (positing a political right to initial equality
at each generation; but the right is waivable in order to encourage the previous generation to
produce and save).
8. For recent statements of this position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 304 (1985);
Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 704-05, 710-13 (1986). See also Ronald C. Link, The Rule Against
Perpetuitiesin North Carolina, 57 N.C. L. REV. 727, 818-26 (1979) (positing a non-libertarian
analysis). Viewing these two extreme positions as leading conceivably to a philosophical
antinomy, see HENRY SmtowCK, THE ELEMENTS OF PoLTIcs 52-53, 100 (4th ed. 1919) (1891).
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Professor Lewis Simes called for "a fair balance between the desires of
members of the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations."

9

The prevailing Rule against Perpetuities follows this last ap-

proach. To the question of how long the living will defer to the wishes of
the dead, the Rule replies with sublime economy: for "lives in being plus
twenty-one years."' 0
The premise of this Article is that all such one-dimensional analyses,
generating in turn one-dimensional solutions, oversimplify the problem of
the dead hand. A future interest includes qualitative, as well as temporal,
components. As a matter of public policy, lawmakers should consider not
only for how long but also in what ways a testator proposes to control
property after her death. A testator might, for instance, seek to impose her
will over the subsequent use of property. Alternatively or additionally, she
might seek to control the investment of property, the distribution of
property, or the range of beneficiaries (without precise allocations) eligible
in due course to receive property. In qualitative terms, the dead hand is
not all-embracing; it grips, so to say, with a variety of fingers." Each
imposes a different set of social pressures that have to be addressed
independently. To be sure, legal commentators have not been entirely numb
to these distinctions. 2 Nor have they been completely ignored by all lawmakers. 3 But the qualitative dimension of dead hand control has never
received systematic treatment, and the prevalent versions of the Rule against
Perpetuities-both orthodox and reformed-take no account of it.

9. SIMEs, supra note 2, at 58.
10. Technically, the Rule restricts provisions for remote vesting rather than prolonged
duration, but duration is thereby limited indirectly. The classical introduction to the mechanical
operation of the Rule is W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638
(1938). For a modern recitation, also covering the workings of perpetuities reform legislation,
see Dukeminier, Guide, supra note 4. Suggesting relocations of the line drawn by the Rule,
see, for example, Simms, supra note 2, at 68-70; JoHN H. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE
Rura AGAINST PEaETarums 65-70 (2d ed. 1962). On the rules governing the duration of dead
hand control under civil law, see Edward F. Martin, Louisiana'sLaw of Trusts 25 Years After
Adoption of the Trust Code, 50 LA. L. REv. 501, 508-11, 514-16, 519-20 (1990).
11. We beg the gentle reader's pardon for extending a ghoulish metaphor. Along with its
durational and qualitative dimensions, exercises of dead hand control have still another
"substantive" dimension: the substantive decision of the dead hand to favor one sort of
beneficiary or purpose as opposed to another may have different social consequences. Lawmakers have responded to distinctions in this dimension by establishing special rules to govern
charitable trusts and, e contra, trusts for purposes against public policy.
12. The distinctions drawn thus far have been fragmentary and remain incomplete. See
RICHARD A. PosNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW §18.6, at 512-13 (4th ed. 1992) (distinguishing
conditional and unconditional bequests); Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the LibertarianModel of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723,
734-37 (1986) (distinguishing control over use and distribution); Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal
for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. Rav. 545, 548-49
(1988) (distinguishing bequests in and out of trust).
13. See infra notes 205, 210 and accompanying text.
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One of the proverbial criticisms of the Rule against Perpetuities is its
mechanical complexity. Despite the ease with which it can be stated, the
Rule is anything but easy to interpret and apply.' 4 Attention to the qualitative
dimension of future interests suggests, however, that the Rule may not be
complex enough. By collapsing the various strains of dead hand control
and imposing the same durational limits upon each, the Rule telescopes the
problem of future interests, ignoring structural variations that relate directly
to traditional policy concerns. In order to dispose of those concerns, legal
regulation of future interests may well require more precise calibration
according to the attributes of control which testators seek to retain in any
given case.

The analysis that follows will proceed in stages. In Part I we survey the
larger problem of freedom of testation in order to get our bearings for a
more focused inquiry into the assertion of protracted dead hand control.
We then proceed in Part II to examine seriatim the various categories of
control a testator may wish to exert, appraising their respective social
repercussions and the potential rationales for their legal regulation. Finally,
in Part III we match our qualitative model against the current framework
of future interests law in order to develop, in a broad and preliminary sort
of way, applications that might fulfill perpetuities policy in a more sensitive
and discriminating manner.
I.

TESTAMENTARY JURISPRUDENCE

The testator's right to control property along the plane of time builds
upon a more essential right-namely, her right to bequeath property outright
to beneficiaries. Before a testator can aspire to create a future interest, she
must possess the power to bestow a present interest." The policies that
dictate fidelity to the wishes of the dead in initially distributing property
also bear upon more ambitious efforts to project power beyond mortal
constraints. Substantive analysis of future interests law must therefore begin

14. See supra note 2. Professor Gray's formulation of the Rule required a mere thirty-two
words. But as Professor Leach observed, "these ... words obviously cannot tell [us] the
whole story, else the 833 pages of Gray's treatise would be useless." W. Barton Leach,
Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 746
(1952). One is reminded of Robert Frost's remark on Einstein's special theory of relativity:
"e=mc'; what's so hard about that? Of course, what e, m, and c are is harder." Arthur A.
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 485,
486 n.7 (1967) (quoting Robert Frost).
15. The distinction drawn here between freedom to create "present" and "future" interests
uses those terms in a non-technical sense rather than as terms of art. By future interest, we
mean any bequest in which dead hand control extends into the future, which would technically
include present interests other than a fee simple absolute. Historically, testamentary future
interests first appeared under Roman law. ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF SuccEssIoN IN THM
LATER ROMAN REPUauc 35-39, 52-60 (1971). On their common law origins, see A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF Tm LAND LAW 78-87 (2d ed. 1986).
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with a litany of the justifications for basic freedom of testation in order to
assess whether these, in turn, will sustain more sweeping grants of dead
6
hand control.

A.

Present Interests

The traditional rationales for testamentary freedom are as varied as they
are controversial. Perhaps oldest is the notion that testators have a natural
right to bequeath. 7 Having created wealth by the sweat of her brow, the
testator is naturally free to do with it as she pleases-including passing it
along to others. Locke and Grotius, among other philosophers, took this
view, 8 which after centuries in eclipse has lately drawn flickers of judicial
support. 9 Yet, from at least the seventeenth century, ideologists have
disputed the natural theory of testation on various grounds. As William
Paley observed, not all property that testators own actually owes to their
labor. Paley acknowledged a natural right to bequeath whatever the testator
personally created; but, added Paley, "every other species of property,

16. The right of testation (that is, the right of an owner at death to choose the beneficiaries
of her property) must be distinguished analytically from freedom of inheritance (that is, the
freedom of an owner at death to avoid confiscation of her property by the state). Lawmakers
can deny the first but still grant the second by fixing rules of succession that pay no regard
to testamentary intent; likewise, they can grant the first but curtail the second by deferring to
testamentary intent while heavily taxing inherited wealth. Though some of the traditional
justifications for freedom of testation and inheritance overlap, others, as we shall see, do not.
17. Such a natural right was posited by Roman jurists. On freedom of testation in the
classical world, see LUIGI M.AGLIA, ComPARATivE LEGAL PHMLOsoPHY 732-37, 741-42 (John
Lisle trans., 1921).
18. Locke and Grotius both qualified the natural right of testation, however, insofar as it
conflicted with the testator's natural obligations to his dependents: "a Father may dispose of
his own Possessions as he pleases, when his Children are out of danger of perishing from
want." Jomi LocKE, Two TarATIsEs oF GovERmu NTrrbk. 2, §§ 27, 65 at 305-06, 329 (Peter
Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1970) (1690) (emphasis in original); 2 Huo GRoTTus, DE JURE BELLI Ac
PAcis LrxE
T. s 265 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625); see also IMMANUEL KATrr, THE
METAPnysics op MoRALs 108, 110-11, 171-72 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797), discussed
infra note 23; 2 SAUEL PuraNimo , DE JuRE NATuRAE ET GENTIUM LmBu OcTo 617 (C.H.
Oldfather.& W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688) (quoting G.W. LEiBNIrz, NovA MENtODUS
JUTiSPRUDENTAE (1667)); cf. LoCKE, supra, bk. 1, §§ 88-93, at 224-28; id. bk. 2, § 190, at
411-12 (commenting on the freedom of owners to provide inheritances, and on children's right
to demand them).
19. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67-68 (Fla. 1990). This
theory has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In re Beale's Estate, 113
N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1962) (see also earlier cases cited therein). For a discussion of the case
law, see 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, ON THE LAw OF Wuis § 3.1, at 62-67 (William J. Bowe &
Douglas S. Parker eds., rev. ed. 1962). See also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (offering
ambiguous discussion of the constitutional right of testation); Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance:
A ConstitutionalRight?, 36 RUTGErs L. REv. 741 (1984) (commenting on the constitutional
freedom to provide inheritances). But cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942)
("Rights of succession ... are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only
by sufferance.") (see also earlier cases cited therein).
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especially property in land, stands upon a different foundation." 2 Paley's
critique was at once both perceptive and shortsighted. The notion that one
could acquire natural rights over property through trade rather than direct
production seems entirely to have escaped him. For Paley, such rights could

adhere only in those kinds of property that were intrinsically labor intensive,

"where the value of the labor bears a considerable proportion to the value

of the thing."' z Natural rights did not attach to any other property-even
when purchased with hard-earned silver. But despite this lapse of vision,
Paley did controvert the natural right to bequeath that which the testator
had herself inherited.Y William Blackstone went a step further, asserting a
natural right to dispose of property only during the testator's lifetime. At
the moment of death, the testator lost her right to all species of property,
self-made and inherited, on the theory that nature protects only the living.2
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and other utilitarian philosophers refused to concede even that much. For utilitarians, only the promotion of
happiness could justify the granting of rights; the notion that persons, while

living or dead, held rights of any sort flowing from nature was for Bentham
"nonsense upon stilts."' 24
Seemingly as old as the natural rights rationale for freedom of testation
are other rationales premised on the sort of utilitarian calculus that Bentham
and his disciples methodized. One argument, tracing back to the thirteenth

20. 1 WILIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES or MORAL AND POLITICAL PHiLOsOPHY 221-22
(London 1791).
21. Id.
22. This point has been made more recently by Professor Munzer. STmHEN R. MUNzER,
A THEORY OF PROPERTY 395-96 (1990) ("[The labor-desert principle can support at most a
one-time power of gift or bequest."). But could one counterargue that, by creating property
through labor, the owner has a natural right not only to bequeath to her beneficiary but also
to bequeath the power to bequeath?
23. 2 WILLIAM BLAKcsroNm, CoMiTAmIEs ON THE LAws OF ENOLANiD *10-11 (London
1765-69). Similarly, William Godwin: "It is the most extravagant fiction, which would enlarge
the empire of the proprietor beyond his natural existence, and enable him to dispose of events,
when he is himself no longer in the world." WILA GoDwiN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING PoLrICAL
JusTcE 718 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1793). The argument reaches back at least to Pufendorf
(who also buttressed his criticism of the natural theory of testation with Biblical evidence). 2
PurmENom, supra note 18, at 615-20. Compare Leibnitz, who conceived freedom of testation
as a continuation of the natural right of the living owner, now lodged in the immortal soul:
"[Slince the dead are in fact still alive, they remain for that reason owners of things, and the
heirs [sic] they have left are to be considered as stewards over their property." Id. at 617
(quoting G.W. LEmN'rz, NovA

METHODUS JURISPRUDENTME

(1667)). Adam Smith dismissed

Leibnitz's argument as whimsical. SIrrH, supra note 1, at 63, 466. Compare also Kant, who,
while recognizing that testation did not involve an actual transfer between living persons, still
viewed it as an "ideal" transfer based on an "idea of pure reason" which could be conceived
in a state of nature and which, accordingly, could have the status of a natural right. KANT,
supra note 18, at 108, 110-11, 171-72.
24. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEMY BENTHAM 501
(John Bowring ed., 1962) (ins. n.d.) [hereinafter WoRas]. On this debate, see generally RONALD
CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY

11-58 (1982).
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century jurist Henry de Bracton, if not earlier, holds that freedom of
testation creates an incentive to industry and saving.25 Bracton's assumption-shared by modern social scientists-was that persons derive satisfac-

tion out of bequeathing property to others. 26 To the extent that lawmakers

deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective value of

property will drop, for one of its potential uses will have disappeared. As
a result, thwarted testators will choose to accumulate less property, and the

total stock of wealth existing at any given time will shrink. Testamentary
freedom accordingly fulfills the normative goal of wealth maximization,
which is advanced by its proponents as the best available barometer of

utility maximization. 27
Scholars have offered a number of objections and qualifications to this
argument, however. As is often remarked, persons may strive to amass
wealth over and above the needs of lifetime consumption for a variety of
psychological and other reasons that have naught to do with the longing to
bequeath. Persons accumulate to gratify their egos, to gain prestige, to gain

power-and simply out of habit. Once these impulses are taken into account,
the economic contributions traceable to freedom of testation could turn out

25. The theory applies both to freedom of testation and to freedom to provide inheritances.
For early statements of the principle, see 1 JERMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in
WORKS, supra note 24, at 338 (ins. c. 1775-1802); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *11; 2
HENRY DE BRACTON, ON Tm LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 182 (George E. Woodbine ed.
& Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., 1968) (ins. c. 1230); 1 FRANcIS HUTCHSON, A SYSTEM OF
MORAL PHIOsOPHY 352 (London 1755); 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINcIPLEs OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 221 (Colonial Press 1899) (1848). For modem restatements, see THOMAS E. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OF TiE LAW OF WILLS 34 (2d ed. 1953); ROBERT COOER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 165 (1988); Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465
(1971). See also infra note 146.
26. The nature of that satisfaction-whether (or to what extent) it is genetically programmed
("nepotism") rather than derived from social interaction ("altruism"), and whether it can
involve altruistic impulses other than those signalling interdependent utilities with the benefi-

ciary-remains unclear. For recent discussions, see

HELENA CRONIN,
PEACOCK: ALTRUISM AND SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DA~wrN TO TODAY

THE ANT AND THE
325-80 (1991); Rob

Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501, 526-29 (1990); John H.
Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1981).
27. The normative virtues of wealth maximization are elaborated and defended at length
in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13-115 (1981). But the goal remains
controversial. For debates over the issue, see, for example, Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization
as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and
PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 487
(1980); Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980). For a recent criticism, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law
and Economics, 78 CALF. L. REv. 815 (1990). Disputing the normative legitimacy of wealth
maximization would provide a more fundamental critique of the instant justification for
freedom of testation. For purposes of analysis here, we shall accept wealth maximization as
a valid goal and assess the extent to which it is fulfilled on its own terms by permitting
testators to bequeath present and future interests in property.
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to be small.2 Furthermore, the productivity effect of testamentary freedom
will be offset by the extent to which bequests dampen beneficiaries' incentives to produce their own wealth. On the balance sheet of wealth creation,
a credit in one generation may induce a debit in the next, diminishing the
net intergenerational increase in property. 29
Another argument for freedom of testation, also premised upon the goal
of wealth enhancement, is that such freedom supports, as it were, a market
for the provision of social services. Social life, like commercial life, is not
a one-way street. Though classified by the law as "gratuitous" transfers,
bequests within the family may in fact repay the beneficiary for "value"
received 0 (though of a sort not recognized as consideration under the

28. The point has long been recognized. A.C. Piwou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 718-19
(1932); JOSIAH WEDGWOOD, THE EcoNoMIcs OF INHBRITANCE 213-16, 232 (4th. ed. 1962);
Ascher, supra note 7, at 100-11. Economists have lately sought to determine the impact of
bequest motives on productivity and saving through analysis of empirical evidence. The results
are inconclusive. Cf. B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based
on Estimates of the Demandfor Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. EcON. 899 (1991)
(finding evidence of a strong bequest motive); Michael D. Hurd, Savings of the Elderly and
DesiredBequests, 77 AM. EcoN. RE v. 298 (1987) (finding no evidence of a bequest motive);
see also Denis Kessler & Andre Masson, Bequest and Wealth Accumulation: Are Some Pieces
of the Puzzle Missing?, 3 J. EcoN. PERsP., Summer 1989, at 141; Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. EcoN. PEnsP., Spring 1988, at 41; Franco
Modigliani, The Role of IntergenerationalTransfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation
of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERsP., Spring 1988, at 15.
29. This point is a qualification rather than a criticism, for it applies to inheritance
generally, irrespective of whether the testator or the state selects the beneficiaries in the next
generation. Freedom of testation will not, strictly speaking, adversely affect the productivity
of the next generation, but freedom to provide inheritances could have such an effect. For
discussions, see WEDowOOD, supra note 28, at 207-08; Ascher, supra note 7, at 99; D.W.
Haslett, Is InheritanceJustified?, 15 PHIL. & Pun. AFs. 122, 145 (1986); Joseph Gold, Freedom
of Testation, 1 MoD. L. REv. 296, 297 (1938). It is once again unclear what effect (if any)
bequests have on beneficiaries' propensities to produce; economists have yet to investigate this
question. See also infra text accompanying notes 190-91.
30. Scholarship on the social psychology and cultural anthropology of gratuitous transfers
is surveyed in Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 194-98 (1989);
Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CoRNELL L. Ray. 587, 630 nn.20305 (1989). For some recent contributions to the anthropological literature, see RISK AND
AND PEASANT ECONOMImS pt. 2 (Elizabeth Cashdan ed., 1990). For an
UNCERTAINTY N TIA
economic analysis, see B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045 (1984). For empirical evidence, see MnAvN B. Sussm"N ET AL., THE FAMILY AND
INiERrANCE 83-120, 286-314 (1970); JmEY P. ROSENFEL, THE LEGACY OF AGING (1979).
For a sociobiological perspective on the problem, see John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Part II. Case Study: A Computational
Theory of Social Exchange, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLotY 51 (1989). For a historical discussion,
see KEITH HOPKINS, DEATH AND RENEwAL 235-47 (1983) (on Roman wills). See generally
ROBERT M. AXELROD, Tan EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); JAMEs S. COLEMAN, FoUNDATIONS OF SocrM. THEORY 300-21 (1990); SociAL EXChoGE (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds.,

1980). On the relative significance of intrafamily exchange and intrafamily altruism, see Gary
S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1988);
Donald Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON. 508 (1987).
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common law). 31 What Lord Hobhouse termed "the delicate interdependence
of Parent and Child" could wither were testamentary freedom denied, a
point made by many legal scholars (and dramatists) beginning with Bracton 32
and hinted at still earlier in scripture and classical philosophy. 33 Cast into
the icy language of economics, testamentary freedom serves the public
interest by promoting the creation of greater stocks of noncommodity
wealth. The testator's power to bequeath encourages her beneficiaries to
provide her with care and comfort-services that add to the total economic
"pie."
Once again, critics have challenged this rationale on several grounds. As
one economist has noted, would-be beneficiaries have an incentive to engage
in unwanted, and hence socially wasteful, activities in the hope of capturing
a bequest. This phenomenon, known generically as rent seeking, occurs
whenever persons have access to formally uncompensated transfers. In this
instance, the beneficiaries' worthless behavior becomes a concomitant to
desired reciprocation and vanishes along with it where testamentary freedom
is denied 34 More generally, some scholars have doubted the social utility

31. What is interesting here from the perspective of sociology is the cultural taboo against
acknowledging formally that any exchange is occurring when a gratuity is bestowed. When
persons openly perform social services as a quid pro quo for gratuities they are often subjected
to moral censure. For reasons that remain obscure, but deserve exploration, the culture -of
gifts is premised on a social fiction. For some preliminary thoughts, see HopKnis, supra note
30, at 239; PETER M. BL.u, ExcHANoE AND PowER Ni SocnA L'
BouLWiNG, THE EcoNoMy op Lov AND FEA 25-26 (1973).
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(1964); KmENET

E.

32. HoBHousE, supra note 2, at 187. The argument once again applies to both the right
of testation and the freedom to provide inheritances. Id. at 187-88; 1 BENTHAM, supra note
25, at 337; BLAcKsToNE, supra note 23, at *11; 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 181; 1 PAGE,
supra note 19, § 1.7, at 28 (citing to judicial authorities); Gabrielle A. Brenner, Why Did
InheritanceLaws Change?, 5 INr'L REv. L. & ECON. 91 (1985); Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault
on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 Tun. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1977). The point
has found expression in popular culture, most notably in the work of William Shakespeare.
Wmu
SHAESPEARE, KiNo LEAR (J.S. Bratton ed., 1987); see also BN JONSON, VOLPONE
(Jay L. Halio ed., 1968). The larger point that gratuities function within a social fabric of
implicit reciprocity has been recognized (and parodied) by humbler bards as well. One of us
recalls from childhood the fascination of an episode of the popular television series Bonanza
in which the Cartwright brothers opened a livery stable, only to discover that they were being
lowballed by the competition. They then came up with the idea of offering their livery services
for free and soliciting contributions only. With that social strategy, the Cartwrights cleaned
up!
33. "Give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over thee while thou livest; and
give not thy estate to another, lest thou repent, and entreat for the same.... In all thy works
keep the pre-eminence.... In the time when thou shall end the days of thy life, and in the
time of thy decease, distribute thy inheritance." Sirach 33:20-24 (Ecclesiasticus,New American
Bible). King Lear could have benefited from this advice. See SHAKEsPEARE, supra note 32.
Aristotle discussed the culture of reciprocity between friends and between parent and child in
THE NicHoAcEAN Ermcs oF ARISTOTLE, bk. 8, chs. 15-16, at 276-80 (J.E.C. Welldon ed.,
1912) (ms. c. 334-23 B.C.).
34. James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 71 (1983). Translated into English: "Children all too often make their
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of even the desired activities promoted by freedom of testation. Such
activities can become socially harmful when the testator seeks not to elicit

love and affection but rather to intrude in pernicious ways upon the
beneficiary's personal decisions. 35 But the strongest argument against this
rationale may be the practical observation that supplies of social services
appear generally to be inelastic; they are forthcoming, in poor families as
in rich, more or less irrespective of the suppliers' inheritance prospects. Just
as an assortment of motives drives persons to produce wealth, so does a

complex of motives and emotions stimulate persons to care for each other.
Once again, the economic impact of testamentary freedom could prove to
be small.
A secondary justification for the right of testation is that it would in
practice be difficult to curtail. Were lawmakers to rescind the power of the
will, testators would find other, less efficient ways to direct the distribution
of their wealth. "To attempt therefore to take the disposal out of their
hands, at the period of their decease, would be an abortive and pernicious
project," William Godwin opined two centuries ago. "If we prevented them
from bestowing it in the open and explicit mode of bequest, we could not
prevent them from transferring it before the close of their lives, and we
should open a door to vexatious and perpetual litigation." '36 The point is
well taken but hardly limited to wills: every law implicates costs of enforcement, and some judgment must always be made about whether the game

parents' lives miserable trying to ensure places for themselves in their parents' wills." Ascher,
supra note 7, at. 112. For a related finding by a cultural anthropologist, see COUiN M.
TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE 146 (1972) (discussing unwanted gifts made in order to
oblige reciprocation). But see Gary M. Anderson & Pamela J. Brown, Heir Pollution:A Note
on Buchanan's "Laws of Succession" and Tullock's "'BlindSpot", 5 INT'L Ray. L. & EcoN.
15 (1985) (criticizing Buchanan's analysis); David E. Sisk, Rent-Seeking, Noncompensated
Transfers, and Laws of Succession: A PropertyRights View, 46 PuB. CHOICE 95 (1985) (same).
35. Again, the idea is venerable: while Hegel favored inheritance as a way of maintaining
the cohesiveness of families, he opposed testation, inter alia, because it was "likely to be an
occasion ... for mean exertions and equally mean subservience." GEORG W.F. HEGEL, THE
PHILOsOPHY OF RIGHT (1821), reprinted in 46 GREAT BOOKS OF rHE WEsrERN WORM 62-63

(Robert M. Hutchins ed. & T.M. Knox trans., W. Benton 1952); see also WuiLIAm M.
McGovERN, JR. ET AL., WILLs, TRusTs

AND EsTATEs

§ 3.1,

at 88 (1988); Edward Jenks, English

Civil Law, 30 HARv. L. REv. 109, 119-20 (1916).
36. GODWIN, supra note 23, at 718-19. Similarly, Francis Hutcheson: "Take away this
right and ... men must be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving away
during life whatever they acquire beyond their own probable consumption... ." 1 HurcansoN,
supra note 25, at 352. The argument has been repeated by modem theorists, both in connection
with the right of testation and the freedom to provide inheritances. SiDOwICK, supra note 8,
at 53 & n.1, 105 & n.1; CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 164-65; F.A. HAYEK, THE
CoNsTrruToN oF LmERTY 91 (1960); Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate
Taxation, in DEATH, TAXEs AND FAmiLY PROPERTY 62-63 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977);
cf. Ascher, supra note 7, at 116 (questioning the magnitude of this difficulty). The litigation
predicted by Godwin occurs today in connection with testators' sporadic efforts to avoid the
forced share for a surviving spouse. See generally McGovERN Fr AL., supra note 35, § 3.8, at
118-22.
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is worth the candle. In the present context, we may observe that the game
society has selected, whereby the law does grant freedom to bequeath, also
requires costly illumination: just as testators would maneuver to win this

power were it denied, heirs often maneuver to frustrate it once it is allowed.
Under the current regime of testamentary license, litigation to construe or
to avoid wills, shamefully vexatious and wearily perpetual, occurs all the

time-and has been cited as a drawback of free testation. 37 Whether free
or forced testation would take the larger toll of conflict and evasion is
difficult to anticipate.
Still another argument for freedom of testation offered on occasion is
that such freedom "permits more intelligent estate planning," by allowing
the testator to "take account of the differing needs" of members of her

family. 38 We call this idea the "father knows best" hypothesis. 39 It is
important to notice that the normative foundation for the hypothesis differs
from that of the last three. "Intelligent estate planning" is not synonymous
with wealth enhancement. No wealth is created when a bequest bypasses

one who needs it less to reach one who needs it more. Still, money is not
everything; theorists may (and do) stipulate any number of norms or ethical
values that, along with wealth, contribute to social well-being. 40 For proponents of intelligent estate planning, distribution of the decedent's resources

in response to the particular needs of family members is assumed to be a
social virtue, 4' one that freedom of testation promotes. 42

37. ATKINSON, supra note 25, at 34.
38. This rationale is featured in McGovwRN ET AL., supra note 35, § 3.8, at 88-89. For
early expressions of the argument, see T.H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES

OF

POLrrCAL

173 (Paul Harris & John Morrow eds., 1986) (ms. c. 1879); 1 HUTCHESON, supra
note 25, at 354; SDooWICK, supra note 8, at 100-02; see also infra note 53 (quoting Lord
Hobhouse). The argument presupposes a freedom to provide inheritances, for absent such a
freedom the need for intelligent allocation of bequests within the family would not arise.
39. Those readers sensitive to such matters may substitute for "father knows best" the
culturally obscure but politically correct "parent knows best."
40. On the relativism of the efficiency norm, see, for example, ROBERT E. GOODiN, REASONS
FOR WELFaRE 245-53 (1988). See also supra note 27.
41. The norm has ancient roots, tracing back to scripture: "[A]nd distribution was made
OBUOAT[ON

unto every man according as he had need ....

."

Acts 4:35 (King James). For modem

jurisprudential articulations, see, for example, JOHN Fnns, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RiGHTs 174 (1980); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 276-77 (1971); see also id. at 75-80
for a related concept. Like wealth maximization, need satisfaction can be viewed as a means
of enhancing utility, so long as we are prepared to concede the feasibility of interpersonal
utility comparisons-a controversial point. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. Still,
the norm of need satisfaction could also be said to "objectify" utility, in that the norm
presumably would not acknowledge the bloated wants of the greedy (Professor Nozick's "utility
monsters"). See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974).
42. Distributive variations to fit family circumstances could be achieved without freedom
of testation by giving courts (instead of testators) discretion to divide estates. Such an approach
would, however, entail substantially higher information and administrative costs. Nonetheless,
Great Britain has put into practice a system for deviation from estate plans upon judicial
hearing. Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraintson TestamentaryFreedom-A Report on Decedents'
Family MaintenanceLegislation, 69 H~Av. L. Ray. 277 (1955).
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Whether testamentary freedom typically gives rise to intelligent estate
planning is, however, open to some question. Once again, certain factors
militate against the proposition. Information costs present one impediment,
though these are likely to be small in the family setting. More significant
perhaps is the hiatus that often intervenes between will execution and
testamentary distribution. Wills frequently mature years after they are
executed, and the cost (both economic and psychological)43 of adding codicils
may deter testators from updating estate plans to take into account changed
circumstances. Estate plans become increasingly stale as time passes, and
due to human inertia they tend to remain so.
Furthermore, the assumption that testators will in general use freedom
of testation to craft thoughtful schemes of distribution is not unproblematic.
Only a small fraction of wills is drafted with the assistance of experienced
estate planners. The volume of thought that goes into the process is often
minimal. 44 And a testator may also lack inhibitions at death that tempered
her course of conduct during life. As one astute observer has remarked,
"Making a will is an exercise of power without responsibility. " 45 Living
persons suffer the consequences that follow from their actions; dead persons
do not. As a result, testators making private provision for the distribution
of assets at their deaths are free to behave as responsibly or irresponsibly
as they choose, without bearing the interpersonal costs that living persons
pay for eccentric behavior. There exists, in other words, something close to
a moral hazard of testation. 46 Given all these distortions, freedom of
testation could result in less intelligent estate planning overall than some
have supposed. 47 Father may know best; but, alas, we have no assurance
that in practice he will do what is best. 48

43. Impediments to testation are briefly discussed in JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WiLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 75-76 (4th ed. 1990); Nathan Roth, The Psychiatry
of Writing a Will, 41 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 245 (1987). Cultural superstitions are doubtless
also involved.
44. See Mary L. Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IowA L. REv. 611 (1988)
(arguing that the law should step in to compensate in certain situations for poor estate planning
by testators).
45. M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 JuRm. REv. 172, 173. For an earlier
discussion, see Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (pt. 2), 65 U. PA. L. REv.
632, 657 (1917).
46. Hirsch, supra note 30, at 639. On the concept of moral hazard, see infra note 175.
(Testators who believe in an afterlife may, however, expect to face retribution for their acts
of irresponsibility, up to and including their actions at death.) A related problem arises in
connection with partners or other fiduciaries who are about to retire. In that context, economists
call this the "end-game problem." CooTmE & ULEN, supra note 25, at 244-45.
47. But see the empirical studies cited infra note 164. The prospect of eccentric estate
planning under a regime of free testation again raises efficiency, as well as equity, concerns,
in that disinherited dependents may become public charges. H.R. Hahlo, The Case Against
Freedom of Testation, 76 S.AFR. L.J. 435, 442-44 (1959).
48. Even when father does do what is best, however, thoughtful estate planning is not
necessarily an unmitigated blessing. Testators' efforts to divide their estates in a manner best
suited to the needs of their families could, wittingly or unwittingly, produce resentment and
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A final justification for freedom of testation, formulated with disarming
unaffectedness by Professor Simes, is simply that the power to bequeath
comports with political preferences: "the desire to dispose of property by
will is very general, and very strong. A compelling argument in favor of it
is that it accords with human wishes. ' 49 However ingenious, this analysis
seems less persuasive on closer inspection. While the desire to enforce one's
own will may be general and strong, the desire to enforce someone else's
will-apart from aspirations to the various social advantages already discussed-is less plainly apparent. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, Adam
Smith offered a few thoughts on this matter. He explained human deference
to wills as an outgrowth of "a kind of piety for the dead." "We naturally
find a pleasure in rememb[e]ring the last words of a friend and in executing
his last injunctions," Smith continued, "[and] we would be distressed to
see our [own] last injunctions not performed. Such sentiments natural[1ly
[i]nclined men to extend property a little farther than a man's lifetime." 50
Smith's anticipatory gloss on Simes's epigram helps to expose its logical
edges. While persons ordinarily may desire to carry out the last wishes of
their loved ones, this sentiment cannot be expected to accompany arbitrary
and capricious bequests. Piety follows from mutual affection, and these ties
(to the extent that they persist post mortem) are severed by an unprincipled
estate plan. 5' Nor would most testators likely support the right of others to
bequeath capriciously simply to gain the same right for themselves. Such a
right would be worthless for the majority of testators who have no desire
to make unorthodox bequests.
B. Future Interests
We have in the foregoing pages briefly rehearsed the traditional justifications for freedom of testation. While none is foolproof, a rational
argument surely can be made for each of them (though with counterargu-

conflict among the beneficiaries, who may not all concur with the testator's calculations. Such
intra-family disharmony (sometimes persisting for decades) can constitute a social side effect
of freedom of testation that detracts from its utility as a means of promoting the welfare of
beneficiaries. Still, disharmony can also follow instances of intestacy (where the court applies
a fixed scheme of succession), and it remains unclear whether freedom of testation on balance
aggravates or alleviates the social disruption of the inheritance process. For discussions, see
Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Social Strain of Probate, 6 J. MARITAL & FAm. THERAY 327 (1980);
Sandra L. Titus et al., Family Conflict Over Inheritance of Property, 28 F m. COORDINATOR
337 (1979).
49. Snms, supra note 2, at 21.
50. Smr.n, supra note 1, at 63-64, 466-67.
51. As Hegel put it: "The mere downright arbitrariness of the deceased cannot be made
the principle underlying the right to make a will . .. [for after all no respect would be
forthcoming for his wishes after his death, if not from the family's love and veneration for
its deceased fellow-member." HEGEL, supra note 35, at 62.
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ments following hard on their heels). Accepting these justifications for the
sake of discussion, how well do they serve to support freedom to control
property on into the future? Can they be stretched to cover bequests of
future, as well as present, interests?
As readily appears, some justifications for testamentary freedom hardly
apply to future interests. The argument that bequests operate to support a
market for social services has little if any bearing on bequests to the unborn.
Unborn beneficiaries may eventually feel grateful to the testator, but they
are in no position (at least directly) to reciprocate.5 2 Nor does the argument
that restrictions on testamentary freedom cost too much to enforce carry
over to future interests. While it may indeed be difficult to prevent a
determined testator from making surreptitious distributions to favored beneficiaries, future interests by their nature are legal constructs; they cannot
be conferred with a wink and a nod. The hypothesis that father knows best
may have a slightly broader reach, but it still appears most plausible with
respect to the present generation, with whose needs the testator is acquainted.
There is far less reason to suppose that grandfather, let alone greatgrandfather, will know best-certainly not by comparison to members of
53
the later generation.
The utility of natural rights theory to defend extended dead hand control
is also suspect. For Blackstone, the very proposition of such prolonged
control was the reductio ad absurdum that disproved the natural theory of
testation: "For, naturally speaking, ... if [a man] had a right to dispose
of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would also have a right
to direct their disposal for a million of ages after him; which would be
highly absurd and inconvenient. '"-4 Other early natural rights theorists seem
not to have addressed the point, but modern judicial opinions characterizing

52. "Making sacrifices for a distant posterity is clearly the purest form of [gratuity] that
can be imagined, for there can be no vestige of exchange in it." Boulding, supra note 31, at
97. The point is, however, slightly overstated. Persons have been known to establish trusts for
the care of their graves, see, e.g., McGovmuR ET AL., supra note 35, § 13.7, at 555, and a
testator might similarly bequeath to unborn beneficiaries in order to induce them to honor

her memory-behavior by beneficiaries that could also be described as a limited form of social

"service." For a broader philosophical discussion of this aim, see CARL L. BECKER, The Uses
of Posterity, in THE HEwvErLY Cry oF Tim EirnmrrNTCENTURY PUmosoPHRSs 119 (1932).
53. This insight is, once again, remarkably venerable. Lord Hobhouse made the point over
a century ago when he opined that:
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events
which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see.
Within the former province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity
of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make
for him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest
judgment is constantly baffled by the course of events.
HORHOUSE, supra note 2, at 188. For a recent recapitulation, see GUT.UVER, supra note 2, at
14-16. But see infra text accompanying note 145.
54. 2 BAcscsTo N, supra note 23, at *10.
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freedom of testation as a natural right have taken care to cabin it within
some bounds. For the Florida Supreme Court, the right is "held subject to
the fair exercise of the power inherent in the State to promote the general

welfare of the people .... "

55 Natural

rights thus can appear to have natural

limits at the point where they overstep the bounds of general welfare 56-as,

for instance, when a future interest becomes "highly absurd and inconvenient." Still, such hedging could be viewed as tantamount to abandoning the

concept of natural law. One is hard pressed to discern how nature bounded
57
by utility differs, other than cosmetically, from utility bounded by itself.

Professor Simes's simple suggestion that persons wish to give effect to
the wills of their fellows appears least convincing in connection with future
interests. To the extent that this willingness stems from piety, such ties of
devotion will bind only the generation that knew the testator. 58 Nor will the
opportunity to elaborate their own future interests commonly incline persons
to enforce those of others, for the desire to create future interests within
any one generation does not (at least today) appear to be widespread. 59

This leaves only the productivity-incentive theory of testamentary freedom
to support an unlimited right to bequeath future interests. Other ideological
girders crumble under the weight of futurity. Nevertheless, the superstructure, however wobbly, still stands. All else being equal, the freedom to

create future interests Would remain preferable to its restriction, given the
added wealth such freedom could beget. 60

55. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68 (Fla. 1990) (quoting
Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 1976)). Similarly, in Wisconsin, freedom of
testation is held to be "an inherent right subject only to reasonable regulation by the
Legislature." Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N.W. 627, 630 (Wis. 1906) (emphasis added); see
also In re Ball's Estate, 141 N.W. 8, 10 (Wis. 1913).
56. E.g., David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in ETIcs, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NoMos
XXIV 107, 117 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) [hereinafter ETmIcs].
57. For discussions of this conundrum, see Alan Gewirth, Can Utilitarianism Justify Any
Moral Rights?, in ETmcs, supra note 56, at 158; Leland B. Yeager, Rights, Contract, and
Utility in Policy Espousal, 5 CATO J. 259 (1985).
58. On this basis, Adam Smith criticized entails: "But tho' this piety to the deceased and
regard to the will of the testator inclines us to dispose of his goods and obey his will for
some time after his death, yet we do not naturally imagine that this regard is to last for ever.
In a few years, often in a few months, our respect for the will of the testator is altogether
worn off. A man who died 100 years ago, his will is no more regarded than if he had never
lived." SMrrm, supra note 1, at 65.
59. It would appear that most future interests nowadays are created in order to exploit
extraneous tax advantages (retention of both spouses' estate tax credits and, to the extent still
available, generation skips) rather than to achieve distributive ends. For anecdotal and empirical
evidence, see MoRRis & LEACH, supra note 10, at 17-18; Dukeminier, Uniform Rule, supra
note 4, at 1045-46; Fellows, supra note 4, at 651-54; Leach, supra note 2, at 1140-42; see also
infra note 204. But see SInss, supra note 2, at 58 ("[A] policy in favor of permitting people
to create future interests ...

also accords with human desires.").

60. In examining the utility of freedom to bequeath future interests in property, John
Stuart Mill observed that "persons have occasionally exerted themselves more strenuously to
acquire a fortune from the hope of founding a family in perpetuity," but he added that this
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All else, however, is not equal. Future interests can exact real costs, costs
that lawmakers must weigh against the benefits of permitting testators to
bequeath them. Still, the nature of those costs requires careful analysis. A
cornerstone of the orthodox critique of future interests law is that perpetuities must be avoided in order to preserve a parity of property rights over
time. If lawmakers were to indulge one generation's desire to control
property ad infinitum, they would deprive subsequent generations of the
like opportunity, because later comers would inherit their property subject
to restrictions already imposed. "Tlo come most nearly to satisfying the
desires of peoples of all generations, we must strike a fair balance between
unrestricted testamentary disposition of property by the present generation
6
and unrestricted disposition by future generations," insisted Professor Simes. 1
Freedom of testation must be temporally rationed lest those alive at any
one time apply "the power of alienation ... to its own destruction." 62
This argument, which speaks to the longevity of dead hand control
irrespective of its qualitative attributes, is in fact quite venerable. Critics
voiced it to attack the power to create entailed estates from at least the
seventeenth century. 63 But the argument truly had merit only prior to the
industrial age, when a fixed stock of land represented the main source of
wealth in society. If wealth is a constant, and one generation monopolizes
the benefits of bequeathing it, subsequent generations suffer a clear cost in

consideration was not of great weight because "the incentives in the case of those who have
the opportunity of making large fortunes are strong enough without it." 1 MILL, supra note
25, at 221; cf. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri's Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine-New "Views"
of the Policy Against Perpetuities?, 50 Mo. L. REv. 805, 829-30 (1985) (suggesting that the
power to bequeath future, as opposed to present, interests has a nominal impact on incentives
to produce).
61. SI as, supra note 2, at 59. The argument reappeared in LEwis M. SImSs & ALLAN F.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1117, at 13 (2d ed. 1956); Lewis M. Simes, The
Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. 1Ev. 707, 723 (1955).
62. MoRIS & LEACH, supra note 10, at 17. For other statements of this proposition, see,
for example, 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS 8 (1983); GREEN,
supra note 38, at 174; SmGwicK, supra note 8, at 102-03.
63. SmirrH, supra note 1, at 69-70, 468; ADAM SmITH-, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE W ALTH OF NATIONS (1776), reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 166 (Robert M. Hutchens ed., W. Benton 1952) [hereinafter WEALTH OF NATIONS];
Henry Home (Lord Kames), Considerations Upon the State of Scotland with Respect to
Entails, in WIu.iAm C. LEHmNN, HmNRY HoME, LORD KAuMS, AND T
SCOTTISH ENnoiTENmENT 327, 331 (1971) (Ins. 1759). In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon focused his
criticism of entails on one particular cost to subsequent generations-their power to extract
social services from their children: "the Land being so sure tyed upon the heire as that his
Father could not put it from him, it made the Sonne to bee disobedient, negligent, and
wastfull; often marrying without the Fathers consent, and to grow insolent in vice, knowing,
that there could be no checke of disinheriting him." FRANCIS BACON, The Use of the Law, in
THE ELEMENTs OF THE CommoN LAwns OF ENGLAND 54 (photo. reprint 1978) (n.p., 1630); see
also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *116; infra note 162.
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the loss of those same benefits. 64 That cost, borne forever, must outweigh
the benefit to the one generation that imposes it. But in modem times,
when each generation can produce its own wealth, the loss of opportunity
to bequeath prior wealth does not clearly crowd later comers to their overall
detriment.6 s At one extreme, a legal regime forbidding future interests gives
each generation the opportunity to bequeath all wealth, old and new, but
with the shortest duration of control; at the other extreme, a legal regime
permitting unlimited future interests gives each generation the opportunity
to bequeath new wealth only, but with the longest duration of control; and
each generation will also have the maximum incentive to produce new
bequeathable wealth. In a world of dynamic wealth, both regimes (and
every one in between) achieve a state of intergenerational equilibrium. The
optimal mix of opportunities to bequeath is not plainly apparent.
Future interests can carry additional costs, however. And it is at. this
juncture that a closer study of the qualities of dead hand control becomes
important.
II.

Tmi DEAD HAND: QUALTUATIVE VARIATIONS

A.

Use Restrictiods

One variation of dead hand control that a testator might seek to impose
is a restriction on the use of property, extending into the future. Use
restrictions can take several forms. Within the realm of legal estates in
property (that is, property interests held out of trust), testators can impose
use restrictions by attaching a real covenant to a gratuity or by making the
property defeasible upon violation of the prescribed limitation. 6 6 Alternatively, a testator could establish a use restriction through the medium of a
trust, making an outright transfer to a trustee but fixing rules for the use
by the beneficiaries of trust distributions. A trust instrument thus could
stipulate that the trustee make payments to the beneficiary only for certain

64. Lord Kames conceptualized the problem in this pre-modern context: "noblemen and
gentlemen ... secure every purchase [of land] by an entail: and thus acquisition will be made
generation after generation, till there be not left a single inch of land to be purchased." Home
(Lord Kames), supra note 63, at 329.
65. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the' Nineteenth
Century, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1257-58 (1985) (criticizing Simes's argument as "either
tautological or so vague as to be meaningless"); Epstein, supra note 8, at 704-05 (criticizing
Simes's argument on the ground that intergenerational parity is unachievable).
66. Defeasible fees in real property are valid everywhere, whereas gifts of personalty
conditioned on use for a specific purpose have often, though not always, been sustained. John
L. Garvey, Revocable Gifts of PersonalProperty:A Possible Will Substitute, 16 CATH. U. L.
REV. 119, 149-52 (1966); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONAnVE TRANsFERs
§ 31.2 (Tentative Draft 1988).
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expenses-say, medical care, or education, or housing-as opposed to
providing the beneficiary with an unrestricted income stream. 67
From the imposition of use restrictions, testators may derive satisfaction
that will spur them to productive activity. Such restrictions may gratify the
testator personally by ensuring that her property is used in ways she herself
would prefer. The thought that a beloved piece of property or hard-earned
savings might, from the testator's perspective, be ruined or squandered
could conceivably appall her. Alternatively, the testator could be moved by
paternalism to impose a use restriction. Through this means, she could
influence her beneficiary's consumption decisions (and perhaps, in the long
run, consumption preferences) by subsidizing only certain goods. Such
influence may be seen by the testator to be in her beneficiary's own interest,
and for the paternalistic testator that too is a value. 68
At the same time, use restrictions entail costs. When attached to legal
estates in property, use restrictions limit marketability and productive use,
thereby giving rise to a social cost. 69 A use restriction can also generate
private costs, in that the beneficiary might prefer to spend his inheritance
in ways other than those ordained by the testator. 70 When a use restriction

67. A rare variation of the use restriction is the "conduct restriction," whereby a testator
requires the beneficiary to perform some extraneous conduct as a condition for receiving, or
retaining, bequeathed property. "Trust income to A, so long as A abstains from the con-

sumption of alcohol" would be an example. These sorts of private dead hand control also
have analogues in the realm of public transfers. Governments sometimes redistribute property
in kind (what economists call "merit goods"), for example, food stamps, or set eligibility
conditions for cash redistributions that involve conduct rather than mere status, for example,
unemployment benefits conditioned on job hunting.

68. For an economic analysis, see Robert A. Pollak, Tied Transfers and Paternalistic
Preferences,78 AM. EcoN. REv., May 1988, at 240. For an analysis in connection with public
redistributions, see S.C. Littlechild & J. Wiseman, The Political Economy of Restriction of
Choice, 51 PuB. CHOICE 161 (1986), reprinted in JACK WIsEHAN, CosT, CHOiCE AND POLMCAL
ECONOMY 186 (1989). Conduct restrictions likewise operate to modify behavior in ways that
the testator perceives to be in the beneficiary's best interest (although, again, the mandated
behavior could conceivably gratify the testator personally).
69. Avoiding clogs on alienability was the earliest perceived policy against extended dead
hand control. GRAY, supra note 2, § 268; McGovERN F AL., supra note 35, § 13.2, at 50506; Sums, supra note 2, at 33-38; Everett Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
6 MN. L. Rnv. 560 (1922). Use restrictions could also have a secondary social consequence
(though probably a de minimis one), in that they raise the price of the good which the trust
must be used to buy and lower the price of the good which the beneficiary would have bought
otherwise, at the margin. Whether this small market distortion helps or harms other consumers
is uncertain, however, for it will depend upon whether they prefer the good which the
beneficiary was required to buy or the good she was prevented from buying. Still, by distorting
the market, use restrictions will surely diminish total consumption utility. The purchase of

certain goods (or behaviors mandated by a conduct restriction) could also have secondary
social consequences, if they intrinsically benefit (for example, education) or harm society. To
the extent goods or behaviors are socially harmful, they can, of course, be regulated otherwise.
70. Likewise, a conduct restriction may mandate behavior that the beneficiary prefers not
to undertake. If the perceived cost of the behavior exceeds the value of the gratuity offered,
the beneficiary will disclaim it.
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fails to correspond with the beneficiary's own consumption preferences, his
7
utility falls .
When use restrictions attach to trusts, the associated social cost fails to
arise.2 Assets poured into a use-restricted trust remain freely alienable in
fee simple by the trustee, for the corpus is a revolving fund.73 Accordingly,
the dead hand will not hamper the invisible hand. But the private cost to
beneficiaries will remain, assuming their consumption preferences differ
from the consumption subsidies created by the trust instrument.
Where, then, does all of this leave us? Considered from the standpoint
of wealth enhancement, a use restriction is of efficient duration where the
marginal benefit to the testator of extending the restriction (that is, the
extra amount of wealth she would be willing to pay to continue it) equals
the marginal benefit to the beneficiary and to society of terminating the
restriction (again, the extra amount that beneficiaries and society would pay
to be rid of it). Obviously, one can offer no generalization about where
this point should lie. The answer, even if empirically determinable, which
it is not, 74 will vary from case to case. Still, several simple observations on
the matter do spring to mind."
First, the total cost of a use restriction is bound on average to be greater
when attached to a legal estate in property than when fastened to a trust.
In the instance of a legal estate, the use restriction will impose social, as
well as private, costs. At the same time, one cannot predict the relative
worth to a testator of a use restriction imposed in or out of trust. To the
extent that a testator strives only to modify the beneficiary's behavior, she
should remain indifferent to the choice. For a few testators, however,
particular pieces of property may have sentimental value, which could

71. The beneficiary can decrease the cost of a use restriction by diverting to other uses
resources that he would on his own have devoted to the prescribed use. If in fact the beneficiary
would have spent as much of his own funds on the prescribed use as is provided by the
gratuity, then the restriction becomes costless from his point of view. Also, if the use restriction
mandates purchase of some transferable good, enforcement may be difficult, in that the good
can subsequently be traded for one the beneficiary prefers. (Use-restricted interests cannot
simply be sold ab initio, however, for the use is limited to the named beneficiary. Cf. infra
notes 107, 135-36, 155, and accompanying text.) One special sort of use restriction that might
affirmatively appealto some beneficiaries is a spendthrift provision, which, without pinpointing
how an income stream must be spent, still protects against general creditors' claims by
preventing immediate alienation of the corpus. A spendthrift trust accordingly can be "used"
only for periodic consumption. A restriction of this sort raises independent and complex policy
concerns and so will not be addressed in this Article. For discussions, see infra note 172.
72. But see supra note 69.
73. This assumes that the testator imposes no restriction on the sale of particular trust
assets. The social costs of investment restrictions are addressed infra notes 101-24 and
accompanying text.
74. To the extent that use restrictions burden as yet unborn beneficiaries, the costs they
impose are prospectively unquantifiable. Nor is the amount that "society" would be willing
to pay to avoid a use restriction practically determinable.
75. For a related discussion, see CooER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 165-68.
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increase their subjective preference for a legal use restriction and compensate
to some degree for its added social cost. 76
Second, use restrictions (of all sorts) are apt to grow marginally more
costly with the passage of time, as the state of the world diverges from the
testator's expectations." Simultaneously, the marginal benefit to the testator
of imposing the restriction should diminish over time, dropping off sharply
after the first or second generation. These generations encompass the
beneficiaries with whom the testator is personally acquainted; she will
presumably have less interest in modifying the behavior of future generations
of persons unknown to her.7 8 And even when providing for the unborn, a
testator should feel incrementally closer ties to near descendants whom she
can readily envision (such as unborn grandchildren) than to more79 distant
ones, with whom she can scarcely forge even metaphysical bonds.
Given these dynamics, we can assert with confidence that efficiency will
dictate some finite limit on the life of a use restriction. No matter how
large a value the testator places on a use restriction, mounting marginal
costs will eventually overwhelm it. It seems doubtful that total wealth will
in any instance be maximized by giving effect to a use restriction of infinite
duration.
Still, perceiving an efficient duration for use restrictions is one thing;
imposing it is another. Should lawmakers place mandatory limits on (or
otherwise regulate) the longevity of use restrictions in order to enhance total
wealth? Is this an appropriate area for public intervention into private
affairs? Ordinarily, neoclassical economics tells us, the decisions of private

76. The testator's concern, in other words, might not be (only) that the beneficiary use his
inheritance in a certain way, but that Blackacre itself be used in a certain way. How this
would affect the subjective worth of a use restriction is uncertain. It has been conjectured,
however, that sentimentality toward property is unusual in the United States today. John H.
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MicH. L.
Rav. 722, 737-38 (1988).
77. Whether costs borne by future generations ought to be discounted (at the so-called
Social Discount Rate) is an interesting and unsettled question that we can hardly answer
definitively-ar even tentatively. On the one hand, were the testator to set aside sums now to
compensate future generations for use restrictions that saddle them with costs, one could
readily conclude that future costs should be discounted. By the time designated sums are paid
to future generations, they will have appreciated in value, because in our society investments
tend to earn a positive, inflation-adjusted rate of return. See, e.g., WmiLAM A. KL~mN & JoHN
C. Corr,, JR., Busmnss ORaANZAION AN FWANcE 278-97 (4th ed. 1990). On the other
hand, when no actual sums are set aside and we are simply comparing costs and benefits, it
is less easy to conclude that benefits to the present generation are worth more than costs to
future ones. For discussions of the problem of social discounting, see DAVID COLLARD, ArrTism
AND ECONOMY 159-61 (1978); DEmK PARrT, REAsoNs AND PERSONs 480-86 (1984).
78. See 2 F.W. TAUssm, PaiwcipLEs OF EcoNoMcs 302 (4th ed. 1939); Ellickson, supra
note 12, at 736. Again, this analysis also pertains to conduct restrictions.
79. Even in cases where the value a testator places on a use or conduct restriction stems
purely from personal moral concerns rather than the testator's paternalistic connection with
the beneficiary, or from concern for the property itself, the value would still probably drop
over time, given the tendency of persons to discount benefits that are deferred to the future.
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economic actors require no regulation at all. The market itself ensures that
property will be put to its most efficient use. So long as all interested parties

are perfectly free to bargain over ownership and use, the law need not
intrude on their autonomy. Only market imperfections call for legal regulation in order to increase efficiency. s0

Use restrictions do in fact involve market imperfections, thereby justifying
legal regulation of this variety of dead hand control."' When a testator

creates a use-restricted interest out of trust that clogs alienability, society
as a whole suffers from the resulting suboptimal use of resources. If the
persons who bear this cost could somehow coordinate their efforts, they
would bargain with the testator, offering her a payment to lift the restriction.
But when the harm flowing from the restriction is spread so widely,
bargaining becomes infeasible due to rising transaction costs. Left to its

own devices, the market fails.
Nor will the market dependably communicate to a testator the private

cost borne by beneficiaries when a use restriction attaches to an interest,
whether in or out of trust. No "bargaining" can occur when a testator
extends a true gratuity, for the testator's aim in the transaction is to improve
the beneficiary's, not her own, position. Were the beneficiary (as opposed

to society) to offer the testator a rebate to release a use restriction, the
testator would always refuse: coming from the person whom the testator
seeks to benefit, such a rebate would reduce the testator's utility by
diminishing the amount received by the beneficiary. 2 Optimality is here
impeded not by barriers to coordination, but by barriers to market signals
interposed by paternalism.83 Instead of bargaining, however, the beneficiary

80. See generally COOER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 43-51; Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, 11 J. LEOAL STUD. 1 (1982).
81. But cf. Epstein, supra note 8, at 705 ("The rule against perpetuities and its kindred
rules are not directed toward any kind of externality."). This may be technically accurate, in
that a testator, as absolute owner, could simply consume her property without "cost" to
others. Nevertheless, one component of a use- or conduct-restricted gift, namely the restriction,
does impose a cost that the testator does not bear and that the beneficiary (and society) would
like to avoid. See also A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. ToRoNro L.J.
186, 214-16 (1986) (positing an external cost if the testator's property right is not deemed
absolute).
82. To the extent that bequests are a quid pro quo for social services, however, it remains
possible that some bargaining could take place between testator and beneficiary. But see supra
note 31.
83. Paternalism is indeed a classic source of market failure, precisely because it ignores
market signals (the proverbial screams of the dissatisfied child). The phenomenon is sometimes
parodied by transplanting it into a commercial context, where it does not occur naturally: thus
one occasionally finds as a denizen of theatrical productions the "paternalistic salesman" who
refuses to sell goods to a buyer because he does not "need" them. See WEALTH OF NATIoNs,
supra note 63, at 7. For related economic discussions, see COLLARD, supra note 77, at 122-39;
Pollak, supra note 68, at 242-43; cf. GARY S. BECKER, A TREAnsE ON THE FAMILY 277-306

(rev. ed. 1991) (arguing that altruism can serve as an efficient substitute for bargaining in
certain situations).
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could try to "reason" with the testator, communicating the extent of, and
the justifications for, his displeasure with the juse restriction, in an effort
84
to move the testator's view of what is best for him closer to his own.
Such a process of communication may lead the parties closer to optimality,
but it is not a perfect substitute for bargaining: even the informed testator
may not see eye to eye with the beneficiary over how an inheritance would
best be spent if their disagreement stems from different values rather than
misunderstanding. When a use restriction covers beneficiaries as yet unborn,
these difficulties are further compounded by a barrier to coexistence; unborn
beneficiaries of a future interest can neither bargain nor reason with the
testator8 5 In short, absent legal regulation of some sort, testators can be
expected to prolong use restrictions beyond the (efficient) limits they would
86
otherwise agree to, were the parties negotiating in a commercial context.
If we substitute for the goal of wealth maximization a broader (albeit
vaguer) concern for social welfare, our conclusion that use restrictions merit
regulation would remain unchanged. As earlier outlined, the testator's
insights into the particular needs of her family can serve as a justification
for the right to bequeath.87 Under that theory, use restrictions that are
subjectively costly could still be defended as conducive to the greater good
of beneficiaries. 8 No such argument will offer refuge to a use-restricted

84. Here, however, information and transaction costs may be high. Given that unmatured
wills are private documents, and given cultural taboos against enquiry and discussion, the
beneficiary may not learn what provision the testator proposes to make for him until the
testator's death, when "reasoning," if ever culturally feasible, becomes physiologically impossible.
85. Lord Hobhouse saw the point quite early. He questioned the wisdom of "leav[ing to
landowners the large power they now possess of remaining the owners of property after they
are dead, and can no longer be influenced by the demands and the opinions of the living."
HOBHOUSE, supra note 2, at 179. For modem discussions, compare POSNER, supra note 12, §
18.6, at 512; Ellickson, supra note 12, at 734-37; and Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom
of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REv. 615, 634-44
(1985). Similar arguments have also been advanced to justify regulation of the exploitation of
nonrenewable resources. See TALBOr PAGE, CONSERVATION AND EcoNoMfc EPFcIENcY (1977);
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FuTURE GENERATIONS 40, 50-52, 154, 161-62 (Ernest Partridge ed., 1981).
86. By comparison, many commentators have urged that the Rule against Perpetuities
should not apply to commercial transactions, precisely because these transfers are the subject
of bargaining. 6 AmERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.56, at 144-45 (A. James Casner ed., 1952);
McGovwrN ET AL., supra note 35, § 13.8, at 561; MoRISs & LEACH, supra note 10, at 226.
The Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities takes this approach. UNIF. STAT. R. AoAIST
PERPEorrums § 4, 8A U.L.A. 377 (Supp. 1992).
87. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text at note 68. The defense hinges, however, on an acknowledgment of the
moral legitimacy of paternalism. One could of course argue that use and conduct restrictions
are abhorrent from a moral standpoint because they invade the beneficiary's autonomy. For
Existential philosophers, making hard choices (such as the use of one's resources) is the stuffor even the spice-of life. To deny the beneficiary the angst of hard choices would be to
deprive him of the central aspect of the human condition. MARTIN HEmEGOER, BErNo AND
TmSE 157-59 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962) (1927); for
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future interest, however. Created under conditions of ignorance rather than
knowledge, these restrictions perforce are hit or miss. As a consequence,
use-restricted future interests should tend to reduce both the wealth and

welfare of beneficiaries. Regulation of use-restricted future interests can
again be premised on the inference that the harm flowing from arbitrary
constraints on the use bf wealth outweighs the testator's gratification in
imposing such constraints.

9

There remains a final, if paradoxical, argument for legal regulation of
use restrictions-namely, that such regulation serves to effectuate the testator's own probable intent. When a testator ties a use restriction to a legal
estate or to a trust, she may not immediately appreciate that changing
conditions could eventually render the restriction inexpedient (even from
her own perspective) to beneficiaries. In retrospect, the testator might prefer
that the restriction be removed. By accomplishing that result by way of
state intervention, lawmakers preserve the testator from "error costs"
incurred when she thoughtlessly imposes inflexible use restrictions on future

interests. 90
Professor Jonathan Macey has criticized this justification for regulating

dead hand control as embracing "a peculiar form of paternalism." 91 Pater-

a classic utilitarian condemnation of paternalism, see JoHN STUART MIL, ON LIBERTY 93
(Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1956) (1859). Lord Hobhouse argued against
dead hand control, inter alia, on the ground "that people are the best judges of their own
concerns; or if they are not, that it is better for them, on moral grounds, that they should
manage their own concerns for themselves." HoBaHousa, supra note 2, at 184-85; see also
Jom C. GRAY, RESTRAINTS oN THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 124 (1)& (o), at 118, 120 (2d
ed. 1895). For modem discussions of the paternalism-autonomy problem, see, for example,
GERALD DwOsRKN, Tim THEORY AND PRACTICE OF Au rONOMY (1988); Donald H. Regan,
Justificationsfor Paternalism,in THE LIMrrs OF LAW: NoMos XV 189 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1974); for a Critical Legal Studies perspective, see Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 588-90, 638-49 (1982)
(noting a tension between the need for intervention and its tendency to perpetuate pre-existing
hierarchies). Suggesting that private paternalism (as here) may be more easily justified than
state paternalism, see Tziporah Kasachkoff, PaternalisticSolicitude and PaternalisticBehavior:
Appropriate Contexts and Moral Justifications, in FREEDOM, EQuALITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

79, 81-82 (Creighton Peden & James Sterba eds., 1989).
89. Simes made the point in connection with conduct restrictions. Smms, supra note 2, at
62-63.
90. See the discussions in POSNER, supra note 12, §§ 18.3 - .4, at 508-10; Ogus, supra note
81, at 202-04, 215. Judge Posner asserts that many testators intend implicitly that restrictions,
even when stated inflexibly, be subject to deviation when circumstances change. In other
words, their initial intent is that such restrictions not necessarily apply indefinitely (even when
the will says otherwise). Yet, it seems far more likely, if not virtually certain, that testators
fail to make explicit provisions for subsequent deviation not because they accept the possibility
of deviation implicitly, but because they fail to anticipate the need for such deviation. See 4A
AUsTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.2, at 490 (William F. Fratcher ed., 1987);
Austin W. Scott, Deviationfrom the Terms of a Trust, 44 HARv. L. Rv.1025, 1027 (1931);
see also Lord Coke's observation in Roberts v. Roberts, 80 Eng. Rep. 1002, 1003 (K.B. 1613)
("the testator ...

never once dreamt or thought of this . .

").

91. Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trustsfor the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EmoRY L.J.
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nalistic it is, and peculiar too, though its peculiarity stems from aspects of
the problem different from the one Macey identifies. 92 According to Macey,
"[p]eople forming trusts clearly will take the possibility of unforeseen
contingencies into account when creating the trust." 93 If they still prefer to
impose the restriction "after the possibility of error has been factored into
the individual's utility calculation, then a basic respect for property rights
would require that settlors be able to establish trusts as they see fit."94 In
this view, state paternalism is unwarranted (or peculiar) because the testator
in these circumstances is behaving rationally.
That assumption, however, is problematic. Testators may not at all
"clearly" recognize the implications of their action when they impose use
restrictions. They might very well intend a different result in hindsight. The
difficulty, which both cognitive psychologists and down-to-earth estate planners have noticed, is that human persons often forget that they inhabit a
changing world. They tend, perhaps systematically, to underestimate the
likelihood that inflexible provisions for the future, including use restrictions,
will fail to suit evolving circumstances. 95 To protect testators from this

295, 307 (1988). The rationale has also been criticized for the indeterminacy of the standard
of unforeseeability that it would require courts to apply. Alexander, supra note 65, at 126162.
92. One peculiarity is simply the fact that state paternalism is here being posited to temper
the testator's private paternalistic impulses, as reflected in use restrictions. See supra text
accompanying note 68. Thus, it is actually a sort of meta-paternalism!
93. Macey, supra note 91, at 307.
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. W. BARTON LEACH & JAMEs K. LoGAN, CASES AND TaxT ON FutuRE INTERESTS AND
ESTATE PLANNING 241-42 (1961); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAwYmts: A
BEHAWoRAL APPROACH 123-24 (1970) [hereinafter DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERs]; THOMAS
L. SHAFFER & CAROL A. MOONEY, THE PLANNiNOr AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 13-14

(3d ed. 1991); Paul B. Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43 B.U. L. REv. 179,
191-92 (1963). The phenomenon was spotted quite early, and was cited to justify the Rule
against Perpetuities in the seminal Duke of Norfolk's Case, where Lord Chancellor Nottingham
observed that testators who established perpetual estates "do fight against God, for they
pretend to such a Stability in human Affairs, as the Nature of them admits not of . .. ."
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (Ch. 1682). Cognitive psychologists have
posited a number of heuristic devices that help to explain such behavior. By the process of
decision framing, persons create simplified analytical models (e.g., temporal stasis) to evaluate
decisions in order to reduce cognitive strain. And by the process of anchoring, persons make
predictions by focusing on a single clue or circumstance (e.g., current needs) and ignoring
other ones. On the cognitive psychology of decision making and predictive bias, see Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PsYcHOt. REv. 237 (1973);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
Sci. 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986), reprinted in TrE Lnrrs OF
RATIONAITrY 60 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990). The psychological defense

mechanism of "denial" may also be involved: persons may resist projecting into the future,
for to do so they must contemplate their old age or death. See ANNA FRnuD, THE Eco AND
THE MECHANiSMS OF DEFENSE 133-34 (Cecil Baines trans., International Universities Press, Inc.
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failing would not be to indulge in an unusual form of paternalism. The
law elsewhere operates to protect persons from the consequences of other
recognized impairments to rational judgment, such as impulsiveness, that
can cause them to act in ways they would subsequently regret. Though
often implicit, state paternalism of this sort abounds.96

What is truly peculiar here is the context. The error cost that a testator
incurs in overlooking or underestimating the possibility of change comes to
light only after she is dead. Yet the dead hand (and mind) has presumably

lost its capacity to regret!9 Ordinarily, error costs could be quantified as
the amount the testator would be willing to pay to release a bequest from

an ill-conceived restriction. The concept becomes meaningless once the
testator ceases to exist. To premise legal regulation of the dead hand on

the basis of paternalism thus appears logically, and economically, 9 flawed.
The state simply has no reason to take under its wing the disembodied, for
they can no longer benefit from mortal assistance.9 But that, of course, is

1966) (1936). Cognitive psychologists have also noticed a general tendency for persons to
overestimate the likelihood of positive occurrences, which may be related to denial. This bias
could also adversely affect estate planning capabilities in a systematic way. For a discussion,
see Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALrrY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). For an early anticipation, see WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 63,
at 45-46. Finally, use-restriction planning errors may also be induced by cultural phenomena:
Americans often tend to focus on providing a college education for their beneficiaries in
preference to providing prerequisite support for them during their minority. Professor Shaffer
calls this the "American Dream" syndrome. DEAaH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS, supra, 97-98,
128-30; see, e.g., In re Estate of Kerber, 336 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sur. Ct. 1972). For recent surveys
of the psychology of decision making and of its implications for legal policy, see GEOROE
AiNsLm, PIcOEcoNoMIcs (1992); JON EasTER, SouR GrAPFs: STUMES IN Tm SUBVERSON OF
RATIONALITY (1983); Robert C. Elilckson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 Cm.-KENr L. Rv. 23 (1989); Paul
J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. RL:V. 1127 (1991); Gregory S.
Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?, 7 ECON. & PHIL. 143
(1991); Jozef Kozielecki, Towards a Theory of Transgressive Decision-Making: Reaching
Beyond Everyday Life, 70 ACTA PSYCHOLOoICA 43 (1989); Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice:
The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON. 877 (1991); Thomas S.
Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAmEm L. Rav. 385
(1989).
96. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 786-98 (1983) (noting also several other potential justifications for paternalism);
Kennedy, supra note 87, at 624-38; P.A. Diamond, A Frameworkfor Social Security Analysis,
8 J. PuB. EcoN. 275 (1977); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. Rv. 1393, 1404-18 (1985).
97. Oddly enough, some judges have failed to grasp the point. Upon concluding that a
deceased testator had run afoul of the Rule against Perpetuities, Lord Denedin added sternly:
"and I am afraid he must take the consequences." Ward v. Van der Loeff, 1924 App. Cas.
653, 667 (appeal taken from Ch.). No paternalist, he!
98. The risk of regret here imposes no "cost" on the testator, for it does not affect her
willingness to produce while she is alive, and she is now oblivious to the harm she has caused.
Had she anticipated the harm, she could, of course, have taken steps to avoid it by incorporating
greater flexibility into her estate plan.
99. The idea is accepted in the natural, if not the legal, world. See PArENTAL CAR iN
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not to suggest that living persons cannot so benefit. This analysis in no
wise undermines our earlier conclusion that legal regulation of use restrictions serves to compensate for market imperfections and generally protects
the welfare of beneficiaries. 100
B.

Investment Restrictions

Another way in which the dead hand might strive to assert continuing
control is by leaving instructions for the investment and management (as
opposed to the spending) of bequeathed property. When a testator places
a gratuity in trust, that action in itself effects an investment restriction.
Instead of giving beneficiaries carte blanche to administer the bequest
themselves, that responsibility will now shift to a third party, the trustee.
In addition, the trust instrument could constrain the trustee to invest the
corpus only in certain ways. Instructions for investment could also adhere
to a legal estate, through the device of a forfeiture condition. 01 In most
such cases, the testator's motive would presumably be a paternalistic regard
for the pecuniary interests of her beneficiaries, on the assumption that she
knows better than they how to make the property most remunerative. 10
In one respect, the problem of investment restrictions is structurally
analogous to the problem of use restrictions. Both involve decisions concerning the property that may diminish its value to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries who wish to invest inherited property in a manner contrary to a
decreed restriction might be willing to pay the testator to waive the restriction, if only they could strike a bargain. As in the case of use restrictions,
legal regulation of investment restrictions can function to improve efficiency
by redressing market imperfections.' 03
In another respect, however, the problems differ. If one beneficiary were
given the right to ignore a use restriction, the exercise of that right could
MAmtLs 147-49 (David J. Gubernick & Peter H. Klopfer eds., 1981) (discussing the termination

of maternal care). A possible rejoinder to this argument is that the testator, while alive, wishes
to be prevented from making regrettable use restrictions, because she knows (like Ulysses) that
if she is permitted to do so she will succumb to the temptation. Here, the ostensible justification
for legal regulation is not state paternalism, but rather self-paternalism. (On this conceptual
distinction, see, for example, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 H.uv. L. REv. 1089, 1113-14 (1972).)
See generally JoN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDiEs IN RATIONALITY AND ImnTiONA=mT

36-111 (1979) (discussing "imperfect rationality," the dilemma of knowing that one is susceptible to temptation). It is, however, scarcely clear that testators recognize the need to be

protected from their own instincts in the context of estate planning.
100. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 66.
102. But see infra note 105. Again, a parallel can be drawn to certain public transfers.
Transfers of wealth under the Social Security Act are administered through a series of trust
funds, for example. ARTHUR ABxAis & DAViW L. KoPELA.N, FEDERAL SocIAL SECURIrY

137-39 (1979).
103. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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have no adverse impact on other beneficiaries; a use restriction encumbers
distributions, which are serially independent. 1°4 An investment restriction,
by contrast, encumbers the corpus. Restrictions that apply to the handling
of the corpus at any one time have distributive consequences not only for
the current beneficiary, but for all subsequent serial beneficiaries as well.
This interdependence could leave beneficiaries at odds over managerial
preferences; while some might pay to extinguish an investment restriction,
others, happy with the dead hand's edicts, might pay to preserve it.
What, then, can be said about the wealth consequences of investment
restrictions? Analysis of the matter will vary, depending on the sort of
restriction individual testators seek to impose. If a testator were to specify
that future generations preserve a particular asset-say, a quarry, or shares
in a named enterprise-as the source of their income, then surely the passage
of time would ultimately render all beneficiaries displeased with the choice.
Nothing lasts forever: an oil company may seem a shrewd investment today,
but where will it be when the internal-combustion engine goes the way of
the horse? Such restrictions would also leave a shadow legacy of social
costs. 10,
By contrast, when a testator exerts managerial control only to the extent
of decreeing that the corpus of a gratuity shall stand in trust, a line of
unborn beneficiaries probably would not pay a positive net sum to remove
the restriction. In such a case, the testator has not undertaken rigidly to
dictate a mode of investment irrespective of changing conditions. Instead,
she has delegated management of the corpus to a fiduciary. Investment
decisions accordingly will remain timely, for they will be made on the spot
by a living hand. 1°6
Of course, certain beneficiaries might still prefer to receive their gratuities
out of trust.1°7 Some, as a matter of taste, might derive satisfaction from

104. See supra notes 71, 74. This assumes that each beneficiary will choose to consume the
entire amount of the distribution offered, no matter what the restriction on its use.
105. If the testator requires that beneficiaries retain a particular enterprise, or shares in an
enterprise, then the market for enterprise ownership and control is disrupted. On the problem
of enterprise control, see generally, for example, RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CORPOATE ACQUIsrrToNs 250-498 (1986); KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF
TnE HOSTILE TAKEOVER (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating
the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
CorporateGovernance, 84 COLTm. L. REv. 1145 (1984). See also supra note 69. The testator's
motive here might not be paternalistic. She could be moved by a personal desire to ensure
that an enterprise or other property for which the testator feels a sentimental attachment will
continue to be owned by members of her family. Cf. supra note 76.
106. Of course, a trustee never exercises dead hand control. A corporate fiduciary can cheat
death altogether. And when an individual trustee dies (or resigns), she is replaced by a successor
trustee. 2 SCOTT, supra note 90, §§ 103-106.3, at 87-102.
107. Beneficiaries preferring their interests out of trust can (absent a spendthrift clause or
other impediment) simply sell their trust interests for cash. The transaction cost accordingly
sets the maximum amount beneficiaries would be willing to pay to avoid an investment
restriction. Cf. supra note 71.
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management and direct possession of financial assets. They might enjoy the
simple pleasures of thumbing the financial pages or (like Silas Marner)
delight in running fistfuls of gold between their fingers. 08 Others, as a

matter of interest, might bank on the superiority of their own managerial
talents. And still others, however confident of their personal abilities, might
balk at the price of delegation-for fiduciary relationships do entail costs.

Directly, trustees demand fees for their services, fees that do not burden
legal interests in property.' 9 And indirectly, delegation to a trustee involves
agency costs, in that the trustee has an incentive to favor her own interests
over those of beneficiaries." 0
Standing alongside these beneficiaries will be others, however, who find
profit in trust delegation. For some, the responsibility of tending to the

corpus will seem a burden, from which the establishment of a trust could
spare them. A trust also provides an opportunity for expert management

of the corpus, thereby facilitating an efficient division of labor.'

Even

absent a mandate from the grave, many individuals choose to engage the

services of professional fiduciaries on their own behalf. The proliferation
of mutual funds well illustrates this phenomenon.
It is, however, as an accessory to a future interest that trust delegation
becomes particularly appealing. Direct ownership of property by a line of

beneficiaries involves its own costs. Out of trust, a beneficiary who wishes
to convert bequeathed property must either gain ,the unanimous consent of

his fellow beneficiaries (some of whom may remain unborn) or obtain a

108. See GEORGE ELIOT, SILAs Mmaa 70 (Q.D. Leavis ed., Penguin Books 1967) (1861)
("But at night came his revelry: at night he closed his shutters, and made fast his doors, and
drew forth his gold .... He spread them out in heaps and bathed his hands in them .... ).
109. Considered historically, trusts have not in general been directly profitable to corporate
fiduciaries, however. The trust departments of banks have often played a loss-leader function.
Richard Boling, Can Trust ProfitabilityBe Meaningfully Measured?, 119 Ta. & EST., Mar.
1980, at 43, 44.
110. Agency costs technically comprise the dollar equivalent of the following sum: (1) all
self-interested behavior (shirking, stealing, etc.) by the fiduciary that is too expensive to
prevent, (2) expenditures for monitoring the fiduciary to minimize such behavior, and (3) the
cost of "bonding" devices which render the fiduciary's interests coincident to the beneficiaries'
interests (e.g., basing fiduciary compensation on investment performance). On the problem of
agency costs, see KLiN & CoFFEE, supra note 77, at 160-61; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. Fr. ECON. 305 (1976). For an early recognition of this problem in connection with trusts,
see SIDGWICK, supra note 8, at 102. Agency costs are probably lower in a trust than in a
corporation (or a government), because its principals are fewer and so have an incentive to
monitor. If the principals are numerous, none may have an adequate inducement to warrant
the cost of monitoring, and so the group may collectively succumb to "rational apathy." See
MANCUR OLSON, JR., Tim LoGic OF CoLz cTvE ACTION 9-16, 21-36, 163-65 & n.102 (Schocken
Books 1971) (1965). For a further discussion of the agency costs of trusts, see Macey, supra
note 91, at 315-21.
11. David R. Frazer, Five Myths of Estate Planning, 124 TR. & EST., Dec. 1985, at 16,
18; Ogus, supra note 81, at 188.
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court order to permit sale.1 12 Either process involves obvious inefficiencies.
And because impediments to marketability hinder transfers of property to
their most efficient users, future interests created out of trust also impose
13
a social cost.
Even if the testator drafted around these problems by granting a serial
power of sale and reinvestment in each possessory beneficiary, conflicts of
interest could still arise. Given that the managerial decisions made by any
one beneficiary will affect those later in line, most beneficiaries would
probably prefer continuous fiduciary management, even at the cost of their
own unfettered freedom, to reduce the danger that preceding beneficiaries
would mismanage the corpus and leave them with nothing.1 1 4 In short,
considered in isolation, a proviso that a future interest be held in trust,
even in perpetuity, will likely appeal to most beneficiaries." 5 And so long
as a trustee has authority to invest as she in good faith sees fit, a trust also
6
serves to avoid social costs."

112. The distribution of managerial power among beneficiaries in a future interest chain is
up to the testator. While the testator can decline to exert managerial control herself, she
cannot avoid making some determination (whether by action or inaction) about how managerial
power will be shared among multiple beneficiaries. Absent an expression of intent to the
contrary, the common law grants each possessor in turn a power of control other than sale
and reinvestment. The testator can by express provision modify these rights, for example, to
create a serial, instead of a consensual, power of sale. See generally DUKEmnmIR & JoHASON,
supra note 43, at 444-45; Candler S. Rogers, Removal of Future Interest Encumbrances-Sale
of the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VND. L. REv. 1437 (1964); J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Court's
Power to Order Sale of Property Subject to Legal Life Estate in Order to Relieve Economic
Distress of Life Tenant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1189 (1974).
113. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
114. On this logic, beneficiaries would probably most prefer expert management by a
corporate fiduciary. But management by any fiduciary (for example, the possessory beneficiary
as trustee for all beneficiaries) would still seem preferable to management by a beneficiary
bound by no fiduciary duty. See also infra note 117 and accompanying text.
115. For a different analysis, see Ellickson, supra note 12, at 736.
116. Professor Simes offered a qualification here: He perceived a social cost if trust
administration guidelines preclude venture capital, a form of investment necessary to achieve
"a higher and better civilization." Snss, supra note 2, at 60-61. (This argument, though
generally associated with Simes, also appeared in an earlier, lesser known essay. A. Anton
Friedrich, The Economics of Inheritance, in I SoCiL MEANo OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 27, 32-33
(Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1948).) Indeed, it has been asserted that as a practical (if not a legal)
matter, risk capital will not emerge from a trust even when the testator frees the trustee from
all managerial constraints, due to the traditional conservatism of trustees. George Downing,
The Duration and Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 16 W. Ras. L. Ra,. 350, 363-68 (1965).
Yet, a restriction (de facto or de jure) against venture capital would not preclude risk
investments undertaken, so to say, at one remove. A gratuity limited to low-risk investments
could still include shares in blue-chip corporations with a diversity of divisions (some of which
engage in "risky" ventures) or deposits in financial intermediaries, such as banks, that lend
to entrepreneurs. Furthermore, any shortage of risk capital due to the proliferation of trusts
will draw other investors into the risk capital market. See the discussions in Gareth H. Jones,
The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAxEs, Aim FAmIY PROPERTY 119, 131
(Edward C. Halbach ed., 1977); Moanus & LEACH, supra note 10, "at 16; Ogus, supra note 81,
at 217; Haskell, supra note 12, At 558-61. On existing legal restraints on trust investment, see
infra note 208.
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Between the poles of investment restrictions setting out absolutely inflexible managerial decisions and perfectly flexible trust delegations lies a vast
gray area that we cannot explore comprehensively. But one segment of this
landscape does merit a brief excursion. Suppose the testator were to restrict
a gratuity not to a particular investment, but to a general level of investment
risk. Need a restriction of this sort be regulated? While it is impossible to
predict the preferences of any one beneficiary, both theoretical analysis and
11 7
empirical evidence show convincingly that most persons are risk averse.
Were the testator to limit investment risk by requiring diversification, such
8
a stipulation would likely suit the wishes of beneficiaries as a group.
While a particular risk-preferring beneficiary might be willing to pay to lift
the restriction, her successors would probably offer to pay even more to

117. Of course, there are, and have always been, some persons who do prefer risk, if only
for the sake of relief from boredom. Gambling is "the sweet remedy for inactivity," as
Sophocles said long ago. Fragment from The Palamedes, in DANA F. SUTrroN, THE LOST
SOPHOCES 98-99 (1984) (ms. n.d.). For a startling early reference to risk preference, see
TAcrrus, ON Blmir
AND GmAsNv 120-21 (H. Mattingly trans., 1948) (ins. 98 A.D.)
(describing Germanic tribesmen gambling themselves into slavery). See also JON EaSTER,
SOLOMONIC JunomENms 36-122 (1989) (commenting on the utility of lotteries in decision
making). The evidence for general risk aversion is conclusive, however. For modem discussions,
see, for example, John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. R.s. J. 1, 7-8; William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the
Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIs L. Rav. 341, 367 n.70 (1986). Risk aversion
has traditionally been believed to follow from the decreasing marginal utility of wealth. COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 25, at 58-65. But other phenomena may also be involved. Recent work
in cognitive psychology suggests that when persons assess changes in their welfare they give
greater weight to losses than to gains. Persons apparently experience a stronger psychological
sense of regret when they lose what they conceive to be "theirs" than when they forego a
gain of property that is not yet "theirs"-and they will pay a premium to avoid such regret.
This "endowment effect" provides another possible explanation for risk aversion. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: ExperimentalEvidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of
Value, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 507, 516-17 (1984). On the legal implications of the endowment effect,
see generally David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between
Measures of Economic Values, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 1993); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991). Risk aversion may
also have a genetic component; other species of animals also exhibit risk averse behavior.
Ratonomics, Tan EcoNoM=ST, Sept. 14, 1991, at 76.
118. Diversification eliminates the "specific risk" of particular investments which are otherwise not compensated for by the securities market (precisely because the risk can thus be
avoided). Following diversification, the "systematic risk" affecting the range of investments
in the portfolio will remain, but the market compensates investors (here, beneficiaries) for this
risk. (On this and other aspects of portfolio theory, see, for example, Langbein & Posner,
supra note 117; Wang, supra note 117, at 366-75. But see Eric N. Berg, A Study Shakes
Confidence in the Volatile-Stock Theory, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1992, at CI (describing a
recent study questioning the capital asset pricing model).) Thus, beneficiaries as a group should
be largely indifferent to any restrictions affecting systematic risk imposed by the testator.
Higher levels of systematic risk would not enable income beneficiaries to capture a larger
portion of the remuneration from a corpus. Under existing principal and income rules, trustees
must distribute risk impartially between income beneficiaries and remaindermen. 3A ScoTT,
supra note 90, § 232.
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keep it in place. 19 A restriction of this sort could efficiently persist in
perpetuity. By contrast, were the testator (perversely) to mandate investment
concentration, thereby heightening risk, most beneficiaries would likely agree
that dead hand control was worth paying to avoid. 20 Given the impediments
to bargaining, 121 legal regulation of this type of restriction once again appears
warranted.
A broader view of investment restrictions from the perspective of overall
welfare appears to accord with efficiency analysis. Imposed in the short
term by a knowledgeable testator, investment restrictions limiting the power
of sale can exploit the testator's own managerial expertise, in her beneficiaries' best interests. But over the long run, unforeseen changes in the
investment climate will erode whatever paternalistic benefits such restrictions
hold initially. Regulation could again be premised on the avoidance of
arbitrary restraints that deplete beneficiaries' welfare.

A similar argument conceivably could be made even with regard to the
simple bequest-in-trust. The testator's decision to pass managerial control

over to a third party can protect beneficiaries known to be dull or inexperienced from their own infirmities but may appear arbitrary with respect to
beneficiaries who remain unborn and hence anonymous. Given, however,
the continued
flexibility of investment within a simple trust and the costs
J
it can avoid, this argument ultimately fails to persuade. Estate planners
have long touted trusts as the ideal vessel for a future interest, irrespective

of their beneficiaries' potential abilities. l' " In Great Britain, lawmakers have

119. An individual beneficiary preferring a different level of specific risk from the specified
one might be able to compensate for the restriction by adjusting the investment pattern of his
own portfolio or, again, by simply selling the trust interest for cash. The same can be said of
an investment restriction governing systematic risk, where the beneficiary's individual aversion
to or preference for risk fails to match the risk premium or discount created by the market
for the trust portfolio. See supra notes 107, 118.
120. If, however, the endowment effect contributes significantly to risk aversion, and if
beneficiaries view an inheritance-at least initially-as not being "their" property, then
beneficiaries as a group might be somewhat less willing (if only at first) to pay to avoid a
high-risk investment restriction than they would be otherwise. Beneficiaries might, in other
words, be more inclined to gamble with what they conceive to be the testator's property than
they would be with their "own" (though only so long as they continue, psychologically, so
to view the property). On the endowment effect, see supra note 117. At any rate, beneficiaries
preferring less risk might again be able to take private action to reduce it. See supra note 119.
121. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
122. E.g., Lewis M. Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal, 39 YALE L.J. 771, 779
(1930) ("[I]t may almost be said to be a slip in draughtsmanship to create future interests ...
without the intervention of a trust."); Orin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate
Succession in the United States and England, 67 MIcH. L. Ray. 1303, 1340 (1969). While the
Prudent Person Rule operates to regulate the investment of a trust corpus in ways that do not
constrain beneficiaries who receive their bequests out of trust, the Rule is waivable; and estate
planners have typically advised that it be waived. Langbein & Posner, supra note 117, at 2,
5.
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gone so far as to bar future interests out of trust,U and some American
commentators have proposed to follow suit.' u A minimal investment restriction of this type could be extended indefinitely without doing harm to
beneficiaries as a group.
C. DistributionRestrictions
Still another way in which the dead hand might seek to meddle in the
affairs of the living is by distributing property among beneficiaries, either
living or unborn. This type of control is exercised under the vast majority
of estate plans.1 5 Whenever a testator allocates property among beneficiaries, whether in or out of trust, a distribution occurs. Distributions may
be made intragenerationally among contemporaneous beneficiaries and intergenerationally among serial beneficiaries.'16 Distributions may also be
inflexible (as when the testator specifies precise allocations among beneficiaries) or flexible (as when the testator fixes a pool of beneficiaries and
delegates to a third party discretion to allocate among them). When distributing to members of a future generation, whether flexibly or inflexibly, the
testator cannot name her beneficiaries, so instead she must define them. 2 7
Once again, testators have a greater incentive to produce when in possession of more extensive powers of serial distribution. Such powers create
an opportunity for the testator to satisfy her dynastic ambitions. By sealing
up a corpus of property for generations, safe from consumption or dissipation, the testator could provide an income to a whole line of future
descendants. She might thereby ensure the continued status of her family
and achieve for herself a sort of "vicarious immortality."'12 This opportunity
can enhance the value of property in the testator's hands.
123. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 18 (Eng.); Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo.
5, ch. 20 (Eng.).
124. E.g., C. Dent Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish Legal
Future Interests in Land?, 32 VAN. L. Rav. 1061 (1979); William F. Fratcher, A Modest
Proposalfor Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 DUKE L.J. 517, 549-50.
125. The one exception is the charitable bequest, which restricts use, but for which the
ultimate "beneficiary" is society at large.
126. Once again, distribution-restricted private transfers have a public transfer analogue.
Intragenerational public distributions take the form of government subsidies. Intergenerational
public distributions take the form of tax surpluses (redistributing to later generations) and,
more commonly, deficit spending (redistributing from later generations to the current one).
127. "To A for life and then to A's first grandchild" would be a simple example of an
inflexible intergenerational allocation.
128. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 548 (1964). On the
psychological springs of dynasticism, see also BOULDiNG, supra note 31, at 97; Beckstrom,
supra note 26, at 222-25; supra note 52. Dynasticism probably has a significant cultural
component; Professor Leach believed that the impulse had declined in this century. Leach,
supra note 14, at 726-27. On the history of efforts to assert long-term distributive control, see

4
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pt. 1 (1936). More immediately, intergenerational distribution

restrictions can yield tax efficiencies, and they can also serve to avoid subsequent transfers to
EAL., supra note 35, § 8.1, at
in-laws whom the testator prefers not to benefit. McGovERN'r
301-02.
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The consequences of a distribution restriction for the wealth and welfare
of beneficiaries are more difficult to assess. As with dead hand control over

investment, the level of flexibility built into a distribution restriction may
be crucial to the analysis.
1.

Inflexible Allocations

When a testator divides sums of money between two contemporaneous
beneficiaries, we can conclude that together they enjoy the same total wealth
as they would if the interests were combined in either one of them. In such
a case, allocation is a zero-sum game: whatever one beneficiary would pay
to undo the division, consolidating the interests in himself, the other would

pay to retain it.129 This principle also applies when a testator divides sums
of money between two beneficiaries in different generations. 30 The amount
the current beneficiary would be willing to pay to accelerate and capture

the future interest is its present value-the same amount the later beneficiary
would offer to hold on to it.131 If a testator creates future interests in

129. This is not to say that beneficiaries will each derive the same utility from the property;
they may not. But a utilitarian analysis of optimal property division is hampered by the
difficulty of measuring utility and by obstacles to interpersonal comparisons of utility. See
generally ABBA P. LERNER, TIM EcoNoMcs OF CONTROL 24-40 (1944); I.M.D. Lrrnm, A
CRrTQUE OF WELuFA
EcoNomcs 53-68 (1950) (responding to Lerner); POSNER, supra note 27,
at 54-56, 79; POSNER, supra note 12, § 16.2-.3, at 458-63; AmARTYA K. SEN, ON ECONOIC

INEQuALxn 1-23, 77-106 (1973); Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws, Value Foundations
of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DZmE L. Ray. 817, 823-27 (1989). The analysis
in the text assumes that alternative beneficiaries do not themselves have interdependent utilities.
If their utility functions are interdependent, then both could be made better off by a different
division of the property between them (a possibility that can serve to justify public redistribution
of wealth by government). In that event, however, alternative beneficiaries within a family can
always make further gratuitous transfers to each other in order to achieve Pareto optimality
(a possibility that may not exist, because of free rider problems, when interdependent utilities
tie larger public groups). Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 Am. ECON. Rnv. 542, 542-43 & n.4 (1969).
130. Temporal divisions of property may, however, entail an information cost, in that the
holder of a future interest will not (absent information) know how to value his interest. See
Gail B. Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in
the Trust Pie, 36 HAST. L.J. 563, 582 n.102 (1985) (positing that inexperienced owners may
sell future interests at "a very great sacrifice").
131. Professor Stake argues that temporal limits on allocation enhance utility by ensuring
that more property rights are already in the hands of living persons who possess the capacity
to enjoy them. Redistribution of rights from the unborn to the living, according to Stake,
"represents a direct gain in happiness," by adding "some current utils to the future utils."
Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TmL. L.
Ra,. 705, 739-42 & n.104 (1990). Apart from the problem of making interpersonal utility
comparisons, see supra note 129, which is elided here, Stake seems not to recognize that
redistribution from the unborn to the living will reduce, rather than leave constant, future
utility. If A begins with a life estate and is now awarded unborn-B's remainder, A will "gain
in happiness" from this redistribution only by consuming the whole fee simple, which will
leave B worse off; whereas, if A conserves the remainder for B, A gains nothing from the
transaction.
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property other than money, complications in the process of sale will hinder
marketability of the corpus and thereby generate social costs; but these can
be avoided by creating a serial power of sale or by placing the property in
trust, as previously discussed. 13 2
When a testator slices property into shapes other than definite amounts,
additional problems arise. If a testator chooses to condition receipt of a
future interest (or loss of a present one) on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of some contingency, then the beneficiary is exposed to risk. 33 Most persons
are risk averse. 3 4 As a result, beneficiaries will in general appraise interests
of this sort at less than their expected value. This does not mean that the
market will necessarily discount contingent interests for risk: the specific
risk of the contingency can be negated by merging alternative contingent
interests back into a fee simple, a fact that the market should take into
account.3". But because such mergers would involve a further (and probably
substantial) transaction cost, bids for contingent interests will drop, leaving
beneficiaries worse off. 36 In other words, when a testator injects an element
132. See supra notes 72-73, 112-16 and accompanying text. Intertemporal allocation also
impedes the mortgaging of, and inhibits the improvement of, real property. For recent
discussions, see Alexander, supra note 65, at 1259-61; Stake, supra note 131, at 716-23. See
also supra note 69.
133. "Income to A if A reaches the age of 30, otherwise to B," is a typical sort of
contingent distribution restriction. Note the qualitative distinction between such a contingent
interest and a conduct restriction (for example, "Income to A if A marries, otherwise to B").
Where a beneficiary can by his behavior control whether he receives a bequest, rather than
remaining at the mercy of chance events, then he experiences no risk (although he does suffer
a cost, to the extent that he prefers not to fulfill the condition stipulated). See supra notes
67, 70.
134. See supra note 117.
135. When efficiently avoidable, specific risks are not compensated by the market. Portfolio
theory can here be applied to the problem of contingent interests. See supra note 118. For an
early recognition of the potential for risk negation in connection with contingent interests, see
Watson v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528, 531 (1873), quoted infra note 136.
136. Transaction costs for the sale of contingent interests may be adversely affected (1) by
the lack of an established market in these nonhomogeneous assets and (2) by the bilateral
monopoly of the parties who seek to merge their interests. As an early judge noted astutely
(if not entirely accurately), "no one would bid except the holder of the first estate [that is,
the alternative contingent interest], for the purpose of extinguishing the limitation." Watson
v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528, 531 (1873). While a third party might in fact buy a contingent interest
in the hope of also acquiring the alternative contingent interest, a bilateral monopoly will still
arise when later in the chain of transactions a merger of the interests is sought. This cost
again will be reflected in the third party's initial bid for the contingent interest. (On the
transaction cost problem of bilateral monopoly, see POSNER, supra note 12, § 3.8, at 61-63.)
When an alternative contingent interest is held by an unborn beneficiary, merger of the interests
will require a court order, further inflating transaction costs. See Bird, supra note 130, at 60005. See also supra note 130 (on information costs). All told, these costs will likely be high
and could even exceed the risk-avoidance benefits of a merger. In that event, potential buyers
of a contingent interest, not being able efficiently to negate the risk, would instead discount
for the 'risk. For judicial assessments of the depression of bids for contingent interests, see
Suskin & Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1930); Smithv. Gilbert, 41 A.
284, 285-86 (Conn. 1898); Watson v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528, 531 (1873); Adams v. Dugan, 163
P.2d 227, 231 (Okla. 1945); Mears v. Lamona, 49 P. 251, 254 (Wash. 1897); Howbert v.
Cawthorn, 42 S.E. 683, 686 (Va. 1902).
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of chance into the allocation of her property, we are no longer faced with
a zero-sum game. Even if the corpus is held in trust, and hence is readily
marketable, all contingent beneficiaries, assessing their beneficial interests
from the perspective of risk aversion and transaction costs, will share a less
valuable pie. 137 And again, they cannot readily bargair with the testator to
slice it up differently.'
On the other hand, when a testator bequeaths a life estate in property
or strings together a series of life estates, she may leave behind a more
valuable pie; beneficiaries could appraise these interests above their actuarial
value. A life estate is nothing other than an annuity. And annuities, though
of uncertain value, are a hedge against risk. 39 They are, in fact, the mirror
image of life insurance. One guards against the danger of dying too soon,
and the other cushions the chance of living too long.'40 Nevertheless, links
in a chain of life estates differ from annuities sold commercially, in that
life tenants do not know for certain when their interests will become
possessory; a long-living predecessor may substantially, or even completely,
preempt the next in line. 41 This possibility adds a useless element of risk
to which beneficiaries may be averse, leaving the overall effect on their
1 42
wealth unclear.
If one turns from matters of value to broader concerns for well being,
one can justify more readily the regulation of allocations within a future
generation. Even if a reallocation from one beneficiary to another had no
impact on their total wealth, it could still affect their total welfare, if one

137. The Restaters gleaned the fundamental point: "The division of ownership into successive
interests tends to lessen the amount realizable upon a sale of the separate interests, and thus
diminishes the total purchasing power of the wealth represented by the thing in which such
divided interests have been created." I RESTATEMENT (SEcotD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE
TRANSERS 9 (1983); see also Stake, supra note 131, at 732-39.
138. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
139. Life estates in unborn persons are technically contingent ("unvested") interests; the
contingency here is that they come into being. This is a "risk" that beneficiaries never
appreciate, however. Fixed income annuities also involve an inflation risk, although testators
probably do not often create fixed income life estates. On the testator's power to allocate
income and principal as she chooses, see 3A ScoTT, supra note 90, § 233.5, at 50-51. On the
problem of inflation risk, see WIAM F. SHARPE & GoRDoN J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS
305-12 (4th ed. 1990).
140. Langbein, supra note 76, at 745. Another reason annuities may appeal to beneficiaries
is that they are protected on the downside, so to say, by unawareness: if an annuitant dies
before receiving the full actuarial value of his annuity, he will be oblivious to that eventuality.
141. See Eugene W. Youngs, Future Interests-Problem of the Life Tenant Who Lives
"Forever", 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 3 (1978) (addressing the potential disutilities of life estates).
142. Again, the net aggregate cost, if any, of a chain of life estates is limited by the
transaction cost of consolidating them back into a fee simple. Though life estates, once sold,
lose their potential utility to owners and also entail useless risk (a life estate pur autre vie is
not a hedge!), the market should not discount them for risk if the specific (here, actuarial)
risk can be efficiently negated. But the market will still take transaction costs into account.
See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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had greater need than the other. 143 But allocations on the basis of need are
possible only in the near term. Testators simply cannot divine today the
exigencies of unborn beneficiaries living in a tomorrow concealed by the
fog of time. The testator who would presume to allocate among the unborn
does so blindly, with distributive consequences that are inevitably arbitrary. "
Still, arbitrary distribution of family resources is in one respect unavoidable. When a testator creates a future interest, part of what she is doing is
dividing property among generations. This exercise of power differs analytically from allocations within a future generation. Of course, human persons
lack the foresight to anticipate intergenerational needs with any greater
clarity than they can prophesy future intragenerational needs. No testator
can meaningfully assess ab initio the relative merits of distribution to her
children versus her children's unborn descendants. But, then again, are the
children really better placed to make such an assessment? On the spot
judgments foster informed intragenerational allocations among a group. In
the case of intergenerational allocations, there is no one spot! While the
children will be able to contemplate their own needs more accurately than
could their parent, they will hold only a marginal advantage over her in
predicting the comparative collective needs of succeeding generations. Considered prospectively, even a single generation forward, those needs may
only be dimly perceived. In matters of allocation among generations, decisions by a living hand will be hardly less arbitrary than decisions by a dead
one, for truly sound judgments about intergenerational divisions of wealth
can only be made in the brightness of hindsight. Consequently, the intergenerational divisions mandated by a future interest in property will not
clearly be inferior, in a welfare sense, to those that would result if each
4
generation in turn received an unfettered fee simple. 1
The issue of distribution among generations is further complicated by
another consideration. When a testator chooses to ration the enjoyment of
property serially, she is in the process making a decision to conserve the
property. Conservation of wealth is generally believed to avail society by

143. See supra notes 41, 129.
144. The idea, as usual, is centuries old. In establishing limits on testamentary freedom,
Adam Smith concluded that:
The best rule seems to be that we should permit the dying person to dispose of
his goods as far as he sees, that is, to settle how it shall be divided amongst
those who are alive at the same time with him. For these it may be conjectured
he may have contracted some affection; we may allow him reasonably then to
settle the succession amongst them.
Smrr., supra note 1, at 70.
145. Cf. Sums, supra note 2, at 61-62, 97-99 (arguing that each generation should decide
for itself how much to consume and save); HOBHOUSE, supra note 2, at 182-85 (same).
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contributing to long-term economic growth. 46 Indeed, granting a testator
the right to lengthen a chain of future interests encourages saving in two
ways. Such a right contributes to the testator's own incentive to save, even
as it obligates her beneficiaries to follow suit. To the extent that intergenerational allocations inspire a higher rate of saving, they provide at least
one public benefit, however much they aggravate distributive arbitrariness. 47
In short, justifications for regulating inflexible distribution restrictions,
though not incontrovertible, are nonetheless sustainable. While the wealth
consequences of these restrictions may vary, the arbitrariness implicit in
them is clear. What remains obscure is the marginalimpact of dead hand
control of this sort and the weight society should give to the countervailing
social benefits of encouraging testators to save more of their wealth and of

authorizing them to establish in their wake regimens of wealth conservation
for those who follow.

2.

Flexible Allocations

Distribution restrictions need not be imposed inflexibly, however. Instead
of pinpointing which persons are to receive which lot of property, a testator
could simply designate the beneficiaries of a gratuity and then delegate to

146. Thejgoal of intergenerational capital accumulation is inherently normative, for it is
impossible to value objectively such a reallocation. For an excellent survey of the welfare
economics of saving, see Amartya K. Sen, On Optimising the Rate of Saving, 71 ECON. J.
479 (1961). For a smattering of views, see BouLDiON, supra note 31, at 28, 98-99; COL.ARD,
supra note 77, at 161-65; PosNiR, supra note 12, § 17.6, at 489; RAWLs, supra note 41, at
284-98; B.M. Barry, Justice Between Generations, in LAw, MoPJasrY, AND SocmrY 268
(P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977); Brian Barry, Circumstances of Justice and Future
Generations, in OBLIGATIONS To FUTURE GENERATIONS 204 (R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds.,
1978); Ogus, supra note 81, at 218-19; Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of
•Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 181-82 (1978). Emphasizing promotion of saving
as an aspect of the productivity rationale for freedom of testation, see SmwIcICK, supra note
8, at 104-05; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Succession-Its Past, Future and Justification: An
Introduction, in DEATH, TAXEs AND FAm y PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 5-6.
147. At the same time, accumulation taken to extremes could result in super-optimal levels
of saving and underconsumption, as well as socially unhealthy concentrations of wealth. See
McGovRN Er AL., supra note 35, § 13.9, at 562-63; MoRuus & LEACH, supra note 10, at 266306; SIMES, supra note 2, at 83-109; Ogus, supra note 81, at 218-19. Avoiding undue wealth
concentration stands alongside capital accumulation as a longstanding American social goal,
beginning with republicanism. For historical background, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, AmERICAN
SLAvERY, AMERIcAN FREEDOM 369-70, 377, 382-84 (1975); John V. Orth, After the Revolution:
"'Reform" of the Law of Inheritance, 10 LAw & Hisr. REv. 33 (1992) (on American opposition
to primogeniture and entails). For a modern discussion, see R.H. TAwvNEY, EQUALrY (rev.
ed. 1952); but compare the early argument, disavowed by Adam Smith, that the concentration
of wealth accomplished by entails was socially useful, because it provided a bulwark against
the exercise of arbitrary power by the central government. WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note
63, at 166.
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someone else the responsibility of parceling it out among them. 148 Testators
build distributive flexibility into bequests by creating special powers of
appointment. The donee of the power is authorized to make distributions,
but only to a restricted class of beneficiaries. 149 Testators can also incorporate
special powers into a trust (known as a discretionary trust), by empowering
the trustee to spray principal and/or income among the class of beneficiaries.
Thus imposed, flexible distribution restrictions are mainstays of modem
estate planning. Apart from certain tax advantages, 50 they appeal to testators
who wish to confine property to a closed circle, while leaving room to
adapt distributions within that circle to changing circumstances.'15

a. Equity and Efficiency
The value of a bequest subject to a special power, contemplated ex ante
by its beneficiaries, depends upon the manner in which they expect the
donee of the power to exercise her discretion. If a power will be exercised
randomly or arbitrarily, the beneficiaries hold interests that resemble tickets
in a sweepstakes. Risk averse beneficiaries should prefer a fixed allocation
over a random one. In practice, however, special powers rarely operate in
this manner. Testators establish these powers precisely to ensure that future
distributions will not be arbitrary; their flexibility is designed to permit
distributions responsive to the changing relative needs of the beneficiaries.
Assuming that most donees of special powers exercise discretion on this
basis, 52 the beneficiaries will hold interests more akin to an insurance policy

148. A testator could combine a flexible intragenerationa distribution restriction with an
inflexible intergenerational distribution restriction by requiring her delegate to distribute (in
discretionary shares) a set amount of income and/or principal to beneficiaries at any given
time, and preserve the rest for later comers. Alternatively, a testator could avoid making an
intergenerational distribution by also giving her delegate discretion to invade principal or
accumulate income at any given time.
149. The class of beneficiaries (known technically as the objects of the power) can be as
large or small as the testator chooses. 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 323 cmt. h (1936).
150. See generally DuJEMNmR & JoHANsoN, supra note 43, at 443, 713-15; Amy M. Hess,
The FederalTaxation of Nongeneral Powers of Appointment, 52 TENN. L. REv. 395 (1985).
151. See generally Harrison Gardner, Designing Wills and Trust Instruments to Provide
Maximum Flexibility, 18 EsT. P.AN. 138 (1991); Frederick A. Systma, How to Increase
Flexibility of Testamentary Trusts to Carry Out Decedent's Objectives, 2 EST. PLAN. 194
(1975).

152. A testator may spell out criteria for the exercise of discretion, as when she establishes
a "support trust." Otherwise, trustees might be inclined to make equal distributions to all
beneficiaries, simply as the path of least resistance. But trustees and other donees of special
powers are deterred from making arbitrary distributions by the threat of judicial action against
them for fraud or lack of good faith. See generally 1 R sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
DONATIVE TRANsFJs § 12.2 & cmt. c, § 20.2 & cmts. (1983); SCOTT, supra note 90, §§ 128.3128.4, 187-187.5; Amos H. Eblen, Fraudon Special Powers of Appointment, 25 Ky. L.J. 3
(1936). Suggesting other practical tips to avoid arbitrary behavior by trustees, see Frazer, supra
note 111, at 18.
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than a lottery ticket. And insurance protection should appeal to the risk
averse, at least as much as a fixed allocation."3 Indeed, comprehensive
insurance against need would be difficult to obtain otherwise; commercial
outlets rarely provide it due to problems of adverse selection.-4 Of course,
considering their situation ex post facto, relatively affluent beneficiaries
might seek to opt out of such an insurance pool if they had the chance to
bargain with the testator. But initially, when the future interest is created,
these beneficiaries could be expected to elect coverage; risk aversion compels
this choice when made behind a veil of ignorance.'-"
Considered from the vantage point of distributive welfare, flexible distribution restrictions also avoid a central drawback of inflexible ones. By
delegating rather than dictating distributive decisions, the testator provides
for distributive control by a living (not a dead) hand. The testator's action
here is structurally analogous to the delegation of authority over investment
when a testator decrees that property be held in trust. Assuming that her
delegate remains alert to the beneficiaries' evolving relative needs, their
56
overall welfare will be secured.
Still, when a testator establishes a special power, whether in or out of
trust, she does define the class of eligible beneficiaries. Though the donee
of the power will have authority to make such distributions as she, in her
informed, immediate judgment deems appropriate, those distributions will
remain restricted to the category of beneficiaries set out in the original,
yellowing instrument of gift. The question thus arises whether social welfare
will be improved or impaired by permitting without regulation the temporal
extension of powers for the benefit of classes of beneficiaries whose boundaries (if not precise allotments) are rigidly prescribed.
Here, the public policy that confronts us involves the width, rather than
the wit, of the estate plan. At issue is the breadth of distribution of inherited
wealth in society. That the public holds a stake in this matter is not in
dispute. Most thinkers today accept, almost as an article of faith, that wider
diffusion of wealth is socially desirable. 5 7 One would nowadays have to

153. The popularity of insurance is one of the empirical verifications of risk aversion. See
supra note 117.
154. See the related discussion in GooDn, supra note 40, at 157-59.
155. See generally RAwLS, supra note 41, at 137-42. Similar arguments have been made to

support mandatory public insurance schemes. See, e.g., RicHARD E. WAom,

To

PROMOTE

THE GENERAl, WELFARE 33, 36-37 (1989). A dissatisfied beneficiary could not limit the cost of
a flexible allocation by selling her interest prospectively. Discretionary interests are impossible
to value and hence are unsalable. Cf. supra notes 71, 107, 135-36 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 41.
157. A menagerie of thinkers has mined lodes of distributive egalitarianism out of utilitarian,
political, and moral theory. On the (controversial) assumption that all persons' utility functions
are alike and diminish with each additional increment of wealth, Jeremy Bentham concluded
early that total happiness would be maximized if wealth were equally divided. 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM,

The Philosophy of Economic Science, in

JEREMY BENTH

's ECONOMIC WRITINGS
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search far and wide (perhaps starting in the inner sanctums of the University
of Chicago?) for the political economist who dismissed wealth stratification
as insignificant, let alone championed it as a positive good. 5 ' Current
debates over wealth distribution revolve instead around the optimal "tradeoff" between enforced equality (via taxation) and the greater productive
efficiency that derives from unregulated accumulation. This question remains
both theoretically controversial and politically charged. 5 9 On the other hand,
few would deny that deliberatedispersions of accumulated wealth (via wills),
unburdened by the disincentive effects that accompany involuntary redistribution, serve the public interest and therefore ought to be legally facilitated.
At first sight, limitations on the range of beneficiaries would appear to
hinder the voluntary dispersion of wealth by qualifying the freedom of
subsequent generations to bequeath property more widely. On reflection,
however, the point is not so clear. Even absent a formal restriction, certain
extra-legal forces, empirically verifiable, would operate to cabin in the
objects of most persons' generosity. American society has always been, and
continues to be, characterized by nuclear families.'16 Typically, testators
make the bulk of their distributions to spouses and children, rather than to
collateral relatives, acquaintances, or charities.' 6' Given this social backdrop,

81, 113-17 (W. Stark ed., 1952) (Ins. n.d.); see also LERNER, supra note 129, at 24-40; William
Breit & William P.J. Culbertson, Jr., DistributionalEquality andAggregate Utility: Comment,
60 AM. EcoN. REv. 435 (1970). For well-charted roadmaps through other theoretical quarries,
see WALTER J. BLum & HARRY KALvEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIvE TAXATION
68-90 (1953); WAGNER, supra note 155, at 21-44 (1989). See also supra note 147.
158. Historically, however, the search would be brief. Once it was a commonplace that a
wealthy class was necessary to perpetuate the culture of a society. E.g., HENRY SmGwICK,
THE PRNCICPLES OF PoLITIcAL EcoNoMy 517-24 (1883); see also JoHN K. GALRAITH, THE
AFFLuENT SOcIETY 67-81 (3d ed., rev. 1976); HAYEK, supra note 36, at 125-30; MUNZER, supra
note 22, at 400; WEDOWOOD, supra note 28, at 209-12. In the context of inherited wealth,
primogeniture was glorified in England as both natural and expedient. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK
& FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 273-74 (S.F.C. Milsom ed., 1968);
see also supra note 147.
159. See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. SnGosrz, LECTURES ON PuBLIc ECONOMfCS
394-423 (1980); GOODIN, supra note 40, at 229-35; ARTHuR M. OKuN, EQuALITY AND Em'iciENcY: THE BIG TADEoIV (1975); POSNER, supra note 12, § 16.2, at 458-61, 460 n.2. For a

discussion in connection with inheritance, see Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEx. L. Rav. 1465 (1989). But see Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 847-51 (questioning
this paradigm).
160. The nature of the American family has undergone some change in recent years,
particularly in the increasing frequency of single parent households and unmarried couples,
although its essential, nuclear character remains intact. For recent discussions of trends in
American family structure, see, for example, Tan CHANGING AmERIcAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (Andrew Cherlin ed., 1988) [hereinafter CHANGING AMmuCAN FAmILY]; JAN E. DIZARD
& HOWARD GADLIN, THE MNImAL FAMILY (1990); Felicity Barringer, Changes in Family
Patterns: Solitude and Single Parents, N.Y. Tmns, June 7, 1991, at Al; The 21st Century
Family, NEWSWEEK (special ed. Winter/Spring 1990). Some of the implications from the
standpoint of probate law are considered in Recent Developments, 9 PROB. L.J. 327 (1989).
161. A wide range of studies of probate records, both historical and contemporary, draw
this conclusion. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TnMES TO
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a flexible distribution restriction would have a clear stratifying effect only
when it confined wealth to a segment of the nuclear family. A discretionary
trust for the benefit of the first-born descendants of the testator, for
example, would almost certainly enrich a smaller class of beneficiaries than
would an unencumbered corpus of property. Legal regulation of such a
trust can be justified by the public interest in ensuring broad distribution
of assets (although, once again, that interest must be weighed against the
concurrent policy in favor of spurring testators to productivity).6
By contrast, if a testator imposed upon a bequest a flexible distribution
restriction whose metes and bounds encompassed the nuclear family, her
action probably would narrow only marginally the dispersion of inherited
wealth. Here, the outer range of beneficiaries would be formally restricted,
precluding such subsequent testamentary transfers to nonrelatives or charities
as might otherwise occur. But given the tendency to limit bequests to the
nuclear family, the fraction of the family's wealth siphoned off by such
means would probably have remained minute in any event.
In fact, a flexible distribution restriction encompassing the nuclear family
can function affirmatively to destratify wealth, at least among the testator's
progeny. To illustrate, consider a discretionary trust for the benefit of a
testator's spouse and all of her descendants. If the trust terminated early,
its corpus would be distributed outright to remaindermen, presumably the
descendants then in being. Each one of those descendants, in turn, would
likely apportion most of his property at death among his descendants,
without regard to the needs of other descendants of the testator who are

179-206 (1987) (summarized at 207); EDUARD C. LnDEmAN, WEALTH & CULTUR
50 (1936); SussmAN Er AL., supra note 30, at 83-120; Browder, supra note 122; Allison
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. Cm.
L. REv. 241 (1963); Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 321;
Mary L. Fellows et al., An Empirical Study of the Illinois StatutoryEstate Plan, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 717; John R. Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property
Jurisdiction,50 WASH. L. REv. 277 (1975); Edward H. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The Inheritance
Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 393; Note, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa 'and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IowA L.
REv. 1041 (1978); Joel R. Glucksman, Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does It
Conform to PopularExpectations?, 12 CoLm. J.L. & Soc. PROD. 253 (1976). Many of the
TE PREsENT

relevant studies are tabulated in McGovmER ET AL., supra note 35, § 1.3, at 19-20. A federally
funded investigation of these and other aspects of intergenerational wealth transmission is
currently underway. Janet McCubbin & Jeff Rosenfeld, Introducing the Intergenerational
Wealth Study, 4 PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 25. Drawing the same conclusion for
inter vivos gratuitous transfers, see JosurH G. ALoNJI ET A., Is THE ExTENDED FAMILY
ALTRuisTicALLY LnqxmD? DIRECT TEsTs UsINo MICRO' DATA (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 3046, 1989).
162. See supra note 159. This analysis would also apply to inflexible schemes of serial
distribution, where the named or defined beneficiaries make up only a portion (for example,
a chain of life estates restricted to first-born children) of the family. And, in fact, entails were
abolished in post-revolutionary America, inter alia, because they tended to stratify wealth.
Orth, supra note 147, at 37, 41-42.
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collateral to him. At each generation, a nuclear family fissions into a host
of new nuclear families. Yet distributive equity might be better served by a
reallocation from one subclass to another.
Now consider by contrast an equivalent discretionary trust whose term is
extended. Instead of being partitioned among the subclasses that crystallize
as the family branches off, trust assets here will continue to be sprinkled
among the whole fluid class of descendants. The trustee will stand in a
position to transcend the extra-legal barriers that would otherwise forestall
redistribution among collateral relatives of unequal means. Granting testators the liberty to prolong such a trust would thus promote the destratification of family wealth and (for testators so inclined) encourage
productivity. 163

b.

Trust, State, and Family

One might question on other grounds, however, whether society ought to
permit the intergenerational extension of flexible distribution restrictions,

no matter how broad, despite their potential efficiencies and distributive
equities. One of the interesting features of a discretionary trust is its
similarity to certain other entities that also serve to protect collective wellbeing. Like the "little commonwealth" of the family,' 64 a discretionary trust
can operate as a miniature welfare state, redistributing wealth from the
relatively affluent to the relatively needy.' 65 Yet, as a mechanism for
economic support, the collective welfare state has ever been the target of
various criticisms.'" Those criticisms also bear by analogy on the desirability
of flexible distribution restrictions, suggesting an alternative array of arguments for their legal regulation.
One objection sometimes made to the welfare state is that it undermines
the self-reliance of its citizens. Self-reliance, or "rugged individualism," has
long been exalted as an end in itself, reinforcing the moral fiber of the

163. Of course, flexible distribution restrictions limited to the nuclear family will not help
to destratify wealth between the family and society, but neither would the absence of such a
restriction, given the tendency of testators to limit bequests to family members. Society-wide
destratification can only be accomplished via a system of involuntary estate taxation.
164. The phrase is John Stuart Mill's. I MmL, supra note 25, at 216. That families do
bequeath internally on the basis of relative need is supported by empirical evidence. Gary S.
Becker & Nigel Tomes, Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of Children, 84 J.
POL. EcoN. S143 (1976); Zvi Griliches, Sibling Models and Data in Economics: Beginnings of
a Survey, 87 J. POL. EcoN. S37 (1978); Nigel Tomes, The Family, Inheritance, and the
IntergenerationalTransmission of Inequality, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 928 (1981).
165. We have earlier suggested public transfer analogues to other forms of dead hand
control. See supra notes 67, 102, 126. For a comparison of charitable trusts to the welfare
state, see Sims, supra note 2, at 110-11. See also infra note 172.
166. For recent critiques of the political economy of the welfare state, see GOODN, supra
note 40; WAGNER, supra note 155.
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nation. 67 In precisely this vein, the first Restatement of Propertycondemned
all perpetual trusts as tending to "hamper the normal operation of the
competitive struggle" and hence as obstructing individualism.168 The same
criticism would apply a fortiori to discretionary trusts that provide added
support for needier beneficiaries and hence impede competition both between
beneficiaries and third parties and among beneficiaries inter se.
To the extent that the exaltation of self-reliance is axiomatic, one can
respond only by pointing out that it is today an axiom most thinkers reject.
The modem orthodoxy identifies support of the relatively needy as a virtue,
rather than a vice, of political systems. In the competitive struggle of ideas
at least, it is the weak who have triumphed over the strong. 69 What is
more, those commentators who today continue to condemn dependence on
the state generally extol the traditional bonds of dependency within the
family as morally commendable.170 If, for purposes of modem moralizing,
"the boundaries of the 'self' ... are expanded to include the family but
to exclude the state,"' 7 1 then trusts for the benefit of one's family no longer

167. The theme traces back to the social Darwinists, and still further back to the transcendentalists, in the United States. See generally 2 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 25 (Joseph Slater ed., 1979); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwnmSM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1955). And in the context of gratuities,
see 3 EMERSON, Gifts, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EaMSON, supra, at 93.
On the theme of self-reliance as a modem criticism of the welfare state, see GOODIN, supra
note 40, at 332-59.
168. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 2132 (1936). Curiously, Professor Gray, who had excoriated the spendthrift trust as infused with "that spirit ... of socialism," GRAY, supra note
88, at ix, made no similar argument against perpetual trusts in his treatise on the Rule against
Perpetuities. Cf. GRAY, supra note 2, § 268.
169. As Nietzsche predicted. FRIEDRICH NmrzSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, in ON
M GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HoMo 46-48 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Vintage Books
1969) (1887). By the 1960s, a scholar could state categorically that "[the] concept of a 'free
economy' and the 'survival of the fittest' is as dead as the dodo." Donald Richberg, Liberalism,
Paternalism,Security, and the Welfare State, in THE WELFARE STATE: SELECTED ESSAYS 184,
188 (Charles I. Schottland ed., 1967). Since then, however, neo-conservative scholars have
mounted a renewed challenge to the premises of the welfare state that has muddied the
ideological waters; for example, see CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984). On this
debate, see generally GOODIN, supra note 40, at 1-26, 229-359; THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL.,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990); REmESH MIsHIA, TH WLFARE STATE IN
CAPITALIST SoCIETY (1990); REmESH MISHRA, THE WELFARE STATE N CRISIS 1-64, 161-78 (1984).
Even so, today "the propriety of a minimal welfare state is conceded all around, by politicians
and political parties of all stripes." GOODIN, supra note 40, at 16.
170. On this basis, Professor Goodin criticizes modem self-reliance theory as suffering from
an internal moral contradiction. GOODIN, supra note 40, at 341-59; see also Wilhelm Ropke,
Reflections on the Welfare State, in THE WELFR STATE: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 169,
at 172, 177. But some early commentators did attack intra-family wealth transfers as demoralizing to the recipients, given the ideal of individualism-a position taken, interestingly, by
some prominent "self-made" men. ANDREW CARMEGI , THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 56-57 (Edward
C. Kirkland ed., 1962); WEDoWOOD, supra note 28, at 232; Irving Fisher, Some Impending
NationalProblems, 24 J. POL. ECON. 694, 711 (1916); Langbein, supra note 76, at 737-38.
171. GOODIN, supra note 40, at 353.
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violate the moral imperative (such as it remains) of self-reliance. 72 The
Restatement (Second) of Property implicitly acknowledges this turn of the
political weather vane. It drops from its list of objections to perpetual trusts
any reference to the value of self-reliance. 73
Yet, at a deeper level, concern for self-reliance must flow from fears of
the effects of dependency on behavior as well as from autonomous judgments about moral worth. Critics have often charged that the welfare state
distorts the economic incentives of its citizens. To the extent that welfare
programs provide comprehensive protection against poverty, they operate
like a mutual insurance pool, cushioning against the costs of indolence and
economic failure.174 Yet such insurance simultaneously creates perverse incentives, either to relax efforts or to court failure, because part of the loss
and risk is borne by others.1 75 Confident that government will fly to the
rescue of those in need, citizens of a welfare state may thus be tempted to
work fewer hours, to save less of their earnings, and to take greater gambles
with their financial resources or careers (human capital) than is socially
desirable.1 76 Nor are these the only potential difficulties raised by a governalso invites decepment-sponsored mutual insurance pool. Such insurance
177
tion, known in the present context as welfare fraud.
As already noted, a discretionary trust can also function to provide a
mutual insurance pool.178 And while this attribute will likely appeal to
beneficiaries, society suffers to the extent that beneficiaries modify their
behavior in perverse ways. Here again, by analogy, lie potential grounds
for the regulation of this variety of dead hand control.
172. See Simrs, supra note 2, at 58 (criticizing the self-reliance argument against perpetual
trusts as out of step with the welfare state ideal). Modem commentators have commended the
spendthrift trust as a means of protecting the weak. George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective
Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. Rv.471 (1934);
Note, A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 CoLum. L. Ray. 1323 (1964); cf. supra note
168. In addition, some commentators have posited a moral obligation to provide for one's
immediate descendants. For a recent discussion, see Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be
Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposalfor Change to a System of
ProtectedInheritance, 41 H.AsrNs L.J. 1197 (1990).
173. 1 REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANsraS 8-10 (1983).
174. The analogy appears, for example, in PosNER, supra note 12, § 16.4, at 465-66. But
cf. GOODIN, supra note 40, at 159-60; WAGNER, supra note 155, at 64-65 (suggesting limits to
the analogy).
175. This perverse incentive is what economists refer to as the moral hazard of insurance,
and it is common to all forms of insurance. On the economic theory of moral hazard, see
Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. R.v. 531 (1968).
Extending the problem generally to human interaction, see James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRtnsM, MORALITY, AND EcONoac

TBEORY

71 (Edmund S. Phelps ed.,

1975).
176. Such observations are centuries old, originating in the political theory of poor relief.
GooDIN, supra note 40, at 229-31. For a reference to the moral hazard of state welfare with
respect to career choices, see Pixou, supra note 28, at 491-92.
177. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, WELrARE 160-61 (1978).
178. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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The problem, however, may be less serious than some would believe.
Empirical evidence gathered to date suggests that the ill effects of welfare
programs on their recipients' conduct, though real, are not so significant

as critics had anticipated.

79

While homo economicus responds rationally to

parasitic opportunity, homo psychologicus may cling instead to habits of
labor, thrift, and caution engrained earlier in life. 110 Indeed, within the
confines of the communal family (which can also resemble a mutual

insurance pool),'

children have often been known to rebel against lifelong

dependency, to break out on their own. 8 2 The implications for the behavior
of discretionary trust beneficiaries (as yet unstudied) are encouraging.
Furthermore, to the extent that discretionary trusts do create perverse
incentives, these may be weaker than those that burden a welfare state.
Intriguingly, little commonwealths may develop more effective immune
systems against parasitic activity than big ones do. Communal families
possess the detailed knowledge, monitoring capacity, and administrative

flexibility necessary to deter detrimental conduct. Provided they are minded
to do so, parents can threaten children who "misbehave" with strategic
retaliation. 83 And because the cost of information within a family is
relatively low, the risk of fraudulent claims of need likewise declines. A
welfare state, by contrast, operates under conditions of relative ignorance
and must follow rigid procedures and guidelines for aid eligibility that by
84
and large preclude parental techniques of controlling recipients' behavior.'

179. See generally GooDIN, supra note 40, at 233-35, 338-41; MAtMOR ET AL., supra note
169, at 57-69, 141-44, 219-22; Sheldon Danziger et al., How Income Transfer ProgramsAffect
Work, Savings and the Income Distribution:A Critical Review, 19 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 975
(1981) (synthesizing earlier studies); Dean R. Leimer & Selig D. Lesnoy, Social Security and
PrivateSaving: New Time-Series Evidence, 90 J. POL. EcoN. 606 (1982); Martin S. Feldstein,
Social Security and Private Saving: Reply, 90 J. POL. ECON. 630 (1982). The recent travails
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation amply demonstrate, however, that in certain
instances and under proper conditions the problem of moral hazard can become well-nigh
catastrophic.
180. The psychological literature is reviewed briefly in GOODIN, supra note 40, at 355-57.
181. This aspect of family economy is elaborated in Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak,
The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 372 (1981).
182. For a brief generalized discussion, see BouLDING, supra note 31, at 99-100.
183. Discussing the problem of moral hazard in the context of the communal family, see
Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma,
105 Q.J. ECON. 155 (1990). Tough-minded parents can threaten to reduce support stipends or
bequests to children who shirk work, overspend, or take excessive risks. On strategic behavior,
see LAURENCE J. KoTxoFIO & ASSAF RAZIN, MAKING BEQUESTS WITHOUT SPOILING CHILDREN:
BEQUESTS AS AN Im,ucrr OPTIMAL TAx STRucTuRE AND = Possmmny THAT ALTRUISTIC
BEQUESTS ARE NOT EQUALiZING (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2737, 1988). But parents' feelings of benevolence toward their children could also lead them
to a "soft-hearted" willingness to indulge their parasitic needs. Suggesting widespread disinclination to strategic behavior (soft-heartedness), see Buchanan, supra note 175, at 74-75, 8384.
184. WAGNER, supra note 155, at 197-98 ("The welfare state ... is not a superparent.").
For this same reason, incidentally, the so-called Rotten Kid Theorem should not apply to the
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Nor do state officials have an interest in exercising such control, even
assuming it is feasible." 5
In one respect, a discretionary trust plainly resembles a communal family
more than it does a welfare state. A trust operates on a relatively small
scale and so can distribute flexibly and, if necessary, strategically.186 This
attribute is likely to endure even when the trust is prolonged, at least for
several generations if not indefinitely.' l The tougher question is whether
discretionary trustees will be any more inclined than state officials to exercise
parental influence over their charges. In the case of corporate fiduciaries,
the answer almost certainly is no. "Don't rock the boat!" is the professional
trustee's motto.' 8 In the case of family member trustees, the issue may
hinge on the closeness (both genealogical and social) of the family that the

welfare state. Under this theorem, selfish or envious children in a communal family will
nonetheless maximize total family wealth and will not aid themselves to the greater harm of
other children (i.e., exploit intra-family "externalities") because their parents can be expected
to adjust transfer payments to them and to harmed siblings to take into account their relative
change of economic position. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR 253, 270 (1976); BECKER, supra note 83, at 28796. But in a welfare state, eligibilities and benefits are insufficiently refined to prevent "rotten
recipients" from seizing opportunities to aid themselves, at whatever cost to others. The scale
of the welfare state, in other words, interferes both with the capacity for strategic behavior
and with incentives that motivate members of a communal group to look out for the interests
of the group as a whole.
185. WAGNER, supra note 155, at 173-76. In any event, discretion exercised by state officials
might appear arbitrary and politically illegitimate. Id. at 197.
186. By the same token, the Rotten Kid Theorem should apply to a discretionary trust,
assuming the trustee makes transfer payments on the basis of relative need. See supra notes
152, 184 and accompanying text.
187. Hypothetically, a discretionary family trust, like a welfare state, could encourage
natural increase of the population of its beneficiaries by subsidizing the support of children.
This procreative incentive is related to the more general "commons" dilemma in which persons
overuse a free good or service available to all. See generally MANAGING THE COLmONS (Garrett
Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977). (On the other hand, the barriers to immigration into a
class of trust beneficiaries, surmountable only by marriage or adoption, are more daunting
than those that insulate a welfare state.) Whether, in practice, fertility rates respond to
communal protection remains unclear. See Mary J. Bane & Paul A. Jargowsky, The Links
Between Government Policy and Family Structure: What Matters and What Doesn't, in
CHANGING AMERICAN FAmILY, supra note 160, at 236-38.
188. The incentive to undertake strategic behavior in connection with a mutual insurance
pool stems from utility interdependence. This exists in insurance firms (where moral hazard is
reflected in company profits) and in families (where parents care about their children's welfare),
but not in welfare states, where officials are time-servers and the costs of moral hazard are
widely diffused. See WAGNER, supra note 155, at 173-74. Similarly, an independent trustee has
no personal stake in forestalling parasitic behavior by trust beneficiaries, even though the
welfare of the class of beneficiaries as a whole suffers by it. Indeed, in the case of a support
trust, a trustee might be obligatedto provide for beneficiaries, no matter how blatantly parasitic
they become. A concerned testator might be able to build strategic behavior into the trustee's
duties, say, by requiring her to assess the self-support efforts of beneficiaries as a factor in
making discretionary distributions.
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trust benefits, affecting in turn the trustee's willingness to deal with collateral
relatives in parental ways. 1 9 As a family trust grows over time to encompass
a more extended class of beneficiaries, that willingness is apt to wane.
However serious this problem is, we must bear in mind that the economic
impact of welfare programs (of whatever size) is not unequivocal. Just as
taxation is double edged-simultaneously prodding taxpayers to substitute

leisure for their less-compensated efforts and to increase their exertions to
make up the loss'9-so does benefaction have two sides. Recipients of aid
may be tempted to ease their efforts, as we have noted, or they may receive
the stimulus they need to begin to help themselves. 91 In addition, welfare
transfers can take the form of investments in human capital that are socially
beneficial. Private investors tend to shy away from human capital due to
various market imperfections.192 These same observations apply to trust
beneficiaries. In particular, discretionary trusts would serve the public
interest if they provided subsidies for human capital formation in family
members.' Family resources represent a traditional, and ultimately irreplaceable, reservoir for investment in human capital. 93
Finally, the welfare state and discretionary trusts should be viewed not
only in contrast, but also in context. Given a prior political commitment
to provide for the indigent, the proliferation of private discretionary trusts
might serve the commonweal by reducing dependence on public safety nets

189. In the case of a family trustee, the inclination to behave strategically can arise out of
the trustee's feelings of utility interdependence with the beneficiaries (both those who misbehave
and those whose shares are diminished when misbehavior is subsidized), though these same
feelings of benevolence could also lead the family trustee to soft-heartedness. See supra note
183.
190. See, e.g., BLum & KAL EN, supra note 157, at 21-23. These "two edges" of taxation
are known technically as .the "price effect" and the "wealth effect," respectively.
191. The point was recognized long ago by John Stuart Mill: "Energy and self-dependence
are ...

liable to be impaired by the absence of help, as well as by its excess .... When...

energies are paralyzed by discouragement, assistance is a tonic, not a sedative ...." 2 MmL,
supra note 25, at 468-69. (This notion also underlies the discharge in bankruptcy law. As a
form of insurance against insolvency, the discharge potentially produces moral hazard. But it
simultaneously "gives ... [the] debtor ...

a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the

pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934).) In addition, welfare assistance may prompt the recipient to what Professor
Boulding calls "serial reciprocity," a desire to help others in turn (again, for an early
anticipation of this idea, see AmGHmERi DANTE, ON WORLD GOVERNMENT OR DE MoNAgcmA

3 (Herbert W. Schneider trans., rev. ed. 1957) (ms. c. 1310)). And here, a "reciprocity
multiplier" may even be involved. Bornero, supra note 31, at 26-27; see also Alvin W.
Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A PreliminaryStatement, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 161 (1960).
192. GOODIN, supra note 40, at 154, 237-39; ALAN GORDON, EcoNoMcS AND

SOCIAL

PoUcy

76-90 (1982); GARY S. BEcKER, HuMAN CAPITAL 78-80 (2d ed. 1975). Investment in human
capital serves the public interest because it is, in a sense, a public good that promotes the
economic growth of the nation as a whole.
193. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 76, at 729-39. This is not, however, an affirmative
argument for permitting prolonged discretionary trusts, for assets alternatively inherited directly
by the family would also probably be invested in human capital.
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or subsidies (for example, financial aid for college), to the (limited) extent
that relatively needy trust beneficiaries would otherwise rely on state assistance.194 Often attended by cumbersome and costly bureaucracies, state aid
programs constitute a less efficient means of delivering support than private
family trusts. 9
In short, there appears to be no powerful argument, premised either on
wealth maximization or broader considerations of private and public welfare,
for lawmakers to regulate flexible distribution restrictions tailored to cover
a nuclear family and its descendants. When imposing such a restriction, the
dead hand's grip remains sufficiently loose as to be innocuous, or even
benign.
III.

IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

All of which brings us to the state of the law.
The regulation of future interests is today mainly a function performed
by the Rule against Perpetuities. Essentially, the Rule operates to cut short
a future interest chain that could persist for longer than the lives of those
persons who are living when the interest is created, plus twenty-one years.'9
This boundary applies irrespective of the qualitative attributes of the future
interest at issue.19 7 Accordingly, a testator can drag out dead hand control
to the same limit under the Rule, no matter what qualitative restrictions
she chooses to impose. Neither the model-statutory Rule proposed by the

194. Because prolonged discretionary trusts destratify wealth within a family, see supra text
accompanying note 163, trust distributions may replace state aid more often than if trust assets
had instead been inherited directly by the family. Some testators, however, create "supplemental
needs trusts" to take advantage of concurrent opportunities for state assistance. Cases conflict
over whether trustees of a discretionary trust are obliged to make distributions that will
substitute for state aid. For a recent discussion, see Clifton B. Kruse, Welfare Without Guilt:
Benefiting from a Supplemental Needs Trust, 5 PRon. & PROP., May-June 1991, at 33.
195. The relative efficiency of public and private assistance programs remains controversial,
however. Cf. GooDIN, supra note 40, at 239-45, 325-27, 34349; GORDON, supra note 192, at
168-76; WAGNER, supra note 155, at 170-76, 196-98; Ropke, supra note 170, at 177-78. On
the relative ability of public and private assistance programs to avoid moral hazard, see supra
notes 183-89 and accompanying text. Making a similar argument in connection with the
discharge in bankruptcy (which shifts the cost of insolvency from the welfare state to creditors)
is Jackson, supra note 96, at 1401-04. See also Becker & Tomes, supra note 164, at S156
(suggesting that the efficiency of state aid is diminished by its tendency to reduce private
family redistributions that would occur in its absence).
196. See generally Leach, supra note 10; Dukeminier, Guide, supra note 4.
197. Analysis under the Rule will vary depending upon whether an interest is deemed vested
or contingent, and the qualitative characteristics of a future interest can affect that determination. Nevertheless, because a testator can specify the lives in being that will be used to
measure the longevity of a future interest, dead hand control over any qualitative element can,
with proper drafting, be extended for the same amount of time. Criticizing generally the Rule's
analytical focus on the vested/contingent dichotomy, see Daniel M. Schuyler, Should the Rule
Against PerpetuitiesDiscard Its Vest? (pts. I & 2), 56 Micu. L. REv. 683, 887 (1958).
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Uniform Law Commissioners nor the revised common law Rule proffered
by the Restaters strays from this equation. 19
The expediency of such a "one size fits all" approach to perpetuities
policy is, at the very least, debatable. As we have shown, different sorts of
dead hand control press upon the world in different ways. Consider, for
example, use restrictions and distribution restrictions. A use restriction can
directly impair the value of property.'9 Its radiations are powerful and
draining. By comparison, the wealth consequences of a distribution restriction, stemming from transaction costs and risk aversion, are secondary and
ambiguous. 2°° While the prospect of arbitrariness provides a rationale for
their limitation, intergenerational distribution restrictions also bring benefits
in the form of increased wealth conservation." 1 Viewed broadly, distribution

restrictions appear less burdensome than restrictions that funnel wealth into
the provision of specific goods and services. In this day and age, goods
and services can become redundant overnight; but when money loses its
appeal the field of future interests will truly have been overtaken by events.

Certainly, a case can be made for regulating use restrictions more strin-

gently than distribution restrictions. 2 2 And lawmakers could layer such
regulations in a variety of ways. Further durational limits could be tacked
on to the Rule against Perpetuities, specifically aimed at curtailing use
restrictions. Most simply, these could be made unenforceable after a designated number of years.2 Alternatively, current durational regulations
could be left in place, and other types of rules could be set alongside them.

198. Under the Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities, a flat 90 year period can serve
as a surrogate for the limit imposed by the common law Rule. UNIF. STAT. R. AGAn ST
PERPETurriEs § l(a), 8A U.L.A. 350-51 (Supp. 1992). The Restatement applies a more
conventional version of wait-and-see. I REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) or PROPERTY: DONATIVE
TimsFsRs

§

1.4 (1983).

199. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. Likewise, conduct restrictions can impair the
value of the bequest to the extent that they mandate "costly" behavior. These should be
treated as equivalent to use restrictions for purposes of qualitative analysis. See supra notes
67-68, 70.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 129-42.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
202. Under the Rule in its common law form, the opposite can be true: use restrictions
(and conditional bequests) can be drafted to outlive distribution restrictions, by combining a
fee simple determinable (conditioning continued possession on abiding by the specified use or
condition) with a possibility of reverter in the grantor's estate. Both interests are deemed
vested and are therefore immune to the operation of the Rule. Dukeminier, Guide, supra note
4, at 1905-06. This anomaly has long been criticized, and a number of states have limited the
duration of fees simple determinable by statute. Id. at 1907 & nn.139-40.
203. This simple approach has been taken by the several states that acted to limit the
duration of fees simple determinable, see supra note 202, although the relevant statutes do
not apply to use restrictions and conditional bequests imposed within fees simple subject to a
condition subsequent, where violation of the condition operates to defease the beneficiary in
favor of a third party holding a shifting executory interest (as opposed to a possibility of
reverter in the grantor). These restrictions continue to be governed by the Rule against
Perpetuities.

1992]

THE DEAD HAND

Lawmakers might, for example, levy an estate tax on use restrictions. A
tax of this sort would respond more flexibly to the utilities of individual
testators, allowing those willing to pay for the privilege to prolong this
more invasive form of dead hand control.2" In the alternative (or in
addition), lawmakers could apply a version of cy pres to use restrictions,
permitting beneficiaries to petition for relief from a use restriction that
becomes unduly burdensome. 230 Such a rule already exists to curb the use
restriction's managerial analogue, administrative directives for the preservation of specific investments.? This approach would attack the other end
of the problem, responding flexibly to the future disutilities of individual
beneficiaries.
When one turns to instances in which the testator clothes a delegate with
discretion to invest and/or distribute property, the social product of the
estate plan switches from paralysis to restraint. So long as the scope of

discretion is broadly defined, as when the testator imposes a trust without
further managerial trammels or a special power of appointment that comprehends an entire family, the estate plan lacks arbitrariness and could even
provide some benefits. Here, paradoxically, the dead hand's clasp can play

204. Anecdotal evidence suggests that testators are highly responsive to the tax consequences
of alternative estate plans. See Dukeminier, Uniform Rule, supra note 4, at 1039 n.34, 1045
n.48, 1076 n.149; see also Frazer, supra note 111, at 16. Some commentators have suggested
that an estate tax linked progressively to the duration of future interests could even substitute
for the Rule against Perpetuities. Leonard Levin & Michael Mulroney, The Rule Against
Perpetuities and the Generation-Skipping Tax: Do We Need Both?, 35 Vns. L. Rnv. 333,
356-60 (1990). For an early proposal along these lines, see 2 TAussio, supra note 78, at 30102.
205. Legislation in a few American jurisdictions permits courts (on petition) to modify trusts
or terminate them prematurely, thereby effectively nullifying use restrictions. CAL. PRoa. CODE
§ 15409(a) (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590.2 (1992); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTs §
7-1.6 (McKinney 1992); Omao Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1339.66 (Anderson Supp. 1991); PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6102(a) (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.13(3) (West 1981). Nevertheless, most
states continue to follow the doctrine enunciated in Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass.
1889), requiring strict compliance with the terms of private trusts. See generally Bird, supra
note 130. For commentary advocating cy pres for private trusts, see PosNR, supra note 12,
§ 18.6, at 512; Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of DistributiveDeviation in the Law
of Trusts, 18 HAsTINas L.J. 267 (1967); Wiedenbeck, supra note 60; Douglas G. Hyde, Note,
Variation of Private Trusts in Response to Unforeseen Needs of Beneficiaries: Proposalsfor
Reform, 47 B.U. L. Rv. 567 (1967). But see Macey, supra note 91, at 300-03, 314-15. Again,
some commentators have argued that broad cy pres powers could -substitute for the Rule
against Perpetuities, an approach taken in the Canadian province of Manitoba. R.S.M. chs.
38, 43 (1982-84); Ruth Deech, The Rule Against PerpetuitiesAbolished, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STmD. 454 (1984); Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 834-38. But see Jane Glenn, Perpetuities to
Purefoy: Reform by Abolition in Manitoba, 62 CANAD AN B. Rnv. 618 (1984).
206. On this rule, known as the doctrine of administrative deviation, see 2A ScoTT, supra
note 90, § 167. Given their invasiveness and social costs, trusts requiring investment preservation
could also reasonably be made subject to a special short durational limitation or to a special
tax, as discussed in connection with use restrictions. See supra notes 105, 202-04 and accompanying text.
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a constructive role by refusing to yield to the narrow interests of subsequent
living hands."
When a testator places a future interest in trust, beneficiaries and society
both profit by the property's enhanced marketability. 28 On balance, beneficiaries are also likely to prefer continuous control by a fiduciary to serial
control by non-fiduciaries because serial control would provide weaker
assurances against mismanagement. 209 Nevertheless, when a trust contains
inflexible restrictions as to use or distribution, the private costs associated
with those forms of control still remain. Diminished value and arbitrariness
would continue to justify the regulation of such trusts, although, given their
avoidance of corpus marketability problems, they arguably deserve greater
210
tolerance than their out-of-trust equivalents.

207. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 146, 157-63. This point has largely, but not
entirely, eluded scholars. Professor French appears to apprehend the idea when, in the course
of addressing whether "long-term trusts [are] good or harmful for society or for families,"
she opines that "[a] well drafted trust can provide a stable but flexible financial base for a
family, as well as a source of forced savings for the economy." Susan F. French, Perpetuities:
Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. Rnv. 323, 350-51 (1990).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. At the same time, an investment restriction
that limits managerial discretion within a trust can generate costs independent of those
associated with whatever distribution or use restrictions attach to the trust. See supra notes
105, 206 and accompanying text. Under current law, the testator who creates a trust is free
to add whatever managerial limitations she chooses; but if she limits the trustee's power to
sell trust assets, the doctrine of administrative deviation may subsequently operate to override
the limitation. See supra note 206. The testator is also free to waive all managerial limitations;
in default of an expression of testamentary intent, the trustee can trade trust assets -but must
follow the Prudent Person Rule when investing the corpus of the trust. While several versions
of the Prudent Person Rule are extant, the new Restatement formulation requires (under most
circumstances) portfolio diversification to reduce specific risk, a strategy that will probably
appeal to most beneficiaries without deleterious social side effects. RESTATEMENT OF TRusTs
(TeaD) § 227 (1992); see supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text; see also 3 ScoTT, supra
note 90, §§ 190, 227.5-6, 227.14. See generally POSNER, supra note 12, § 15.6, at 439-42. For
a recent critical analysis of the Restatement revisions, see Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person
Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87 (1990). Given
their likely coincidence with beneficiaries' preferences, trusts subject to the Prudent Person
Rule (at least in its latest incarnation) should be treated no differently from unrestricted
investment trusts under the Rule against Perpetuities.
209. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
210. Cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text. Professor Leach observed that the Rule
against Perpetuities was extended from real property to trusts "without discussion or recognition
of these differences." 6 AMEitcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 86, at 16. Professor Haskell
has proposed the establishment of separate durational limits for future interests in and out of
trust. Haskell, supra note 12, at 548-49. Several American states have passed statutes distinguishing future interests on this basis. In Delaware, the Rule against Perpetuities does not
apply to trusts, which are nonetheless required to terminate no later than 110 years after their
creation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (1989). In Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin,
trusts where the trustee has power to alienate trust assets (and also legal estates where the
possessory beneficiary has a power of sale) are permitted to persist in perpetuity. IDAHO CODE
§ 55-111 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-5-1, 43-5-8 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16
(West 1981 & Supp. 1990). The latter trilogy of statutes, ostensibly applying even to userestricted and conditional trusts, seems to blow out of proportion the policy distinction between
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In contrast, when a bequest incorporates broadly flexible provisions for
investment and distribution-for instance, a discretionary trust encompassing
the testator's spouse and all descendants-no clear justification for regulation appears. A trust of this sort should neither depress value nor foster
arbitrariness; indeed, it can affirmatively benefit a family by providing its
members with comprehensive insurance against need, while availing society
by spreading wealth more equally within that group. 211 Arguably, lawmakers
212
.should permit discretionary family trusts to persist, even in perpetuity.
This is not to say that a discretionary family trust could never outlive its
usefulness. Over time, the pool of beneficiaries (and attendant administrative
costs) might grow so large relative to the corpus that the trust becomes
worthless-a "nuisance trust.1 21 3 Were discretionary family trusts exempted
from the Rule against Perpetuities, lawmakers would do well to leave open
an avenue for termination by court order.21 4 Still and all, such a trust could
continue to serve the interests of a family past "lives in being plus twentyone years."
Some might take exception to the testator's motives for prolonging a

discretionary family trust. The object of hoisting a privileged dynasty onto
society or of engendering eternal filiopiety may strike the mind as unseemly,
to say the least. 25 That could be considered reason enough to rein in the

legal and equitable interests (although the statutes' application to legal estates coupled with a
power of sale-a device analogous to the trust, to the extent that it avoids marketability
problems-is thematic, see supra text accompanying notes 112-16).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 152-95. Discretionary support trusts also fit into
this category. See supra note 152. Whether long-term discretionary trusts that make inflexible
intergenerational distribution decisions (i.e., that fix the amount of income and/or principal
that each generation receives, without dictating distribution within each generation) ought as
well to be free from regulation is unclear. If one accepts the argument, offered earlier, that
reasoned intergenerational allocations are impossible even by the living, then discretionary
trusts that include intergenerational allocations are unobjectionable; they even provide the
added benefit of enforced saving without the harmful side effect of arbitrary intragenerational
distributions. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. Professor Simes (and Lord
Hobhouse before him) objected to intergenerational allocations, however, suggesting that
regulation is again appropriate. See supra note 145. At any rate, so long as a discretionary
trustee is given power to both invade principal and iccumulate income, this potential objection
to prolonged discretionary trusts disappears. See supra note 148.
212. Under the common law Rule against Perpetuities, by contrast, discretionary trusts are
more vulnerable to rule violations than are trusts that fix the distributions of beneficiaries,
because the former create interests that remain unvested until distribution, whereas the latter
create interests that remain unvested only until birth. See Dukeminier, Guide, supra note 4,
at 1904-05. (Still, properly drafted, discretionary trusts can last as long as trusts mandating
inflexible plans of distribution.)
213. Minturn T. Wright, III, Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania-Some Current Trends,
115 U. PA. L. Ray. 917, 926 (1967).
214. California has a statute specifically directed to the termination of trusts on petition
where their continuation has become uneconomical. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15408 (Deering 1991);
see also the statutes cited supra note 205.
215. See supra notes 52, 128 and accompanying text. The testator might also hope to
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dead hand. 216 But to prise open a trust only because its architect fancied
herself an "empire builder ' 217 would be to give cosmetic considerations
undue weight. The fact remains that a discretionary family trust offers
potential social utilities, without causing any clear harm. 21 8 Actions that
benefit others do not become less beneficial when undertaken for ignoble
reasons. 21 9 Here is one instance where lawmakers could with equanimity
step aside and indulge the testator's wish to erect a monument to her own

vanity.

220

CONCLUSION

This Article has called for a more refined outlook on the problem of the
dead hand. Depending on the mix of restrictions that a testator presumes
to impose, the future interests she creates may translate into bane or (just
possibly) boon for those who follow in her path. Time, as they say, is of
the essence, but the quality of time matters too. For all its technical
complexity, the Rule against Perpetuities is curiously simple minded when
it comes to treating qualitative variations of dead hand control. Lawmakers
should take those variations into account, or at least into consideration,
when setting perpetuities policy.
Specifically, three substantive distinctions stand out as fit subjects for
renewed scrutiny. The general application of traditional longevity constraints

encourage the numerical increase of her family. See supra note 187. Lord Hobhouse conjectured
simply that the power of dead hand control "is very commonly exercised to its fullest extent,
merely because it exists, and without the slightest reason beyond the pleasure of exercising
power." HOBHOUSE, supra note 2, at 183; see also GTJuLivER, supra note 2, at 16; Alexander,
supra note 65, at 1218 n.78.
216. See Professor Leach: The Rule against Perpetuities "should be a check on vain,
capricious action by wealthy empire builders." 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
86, at 43. Vain, the extension of a discretionary family trust might be; capricious, it is not.
217. Id.
218. Conceivably, the very prolongation of a family's wealth could be deemed an objectionable feature of perpetual trusts. Dean Gulliver described the Rule against Perpetuities as
"a sort of private anti-trust law." GULLIVER, supra note 2, at 16. Yet, given the alternative
of testamentary transfer at each generation, a discretionary family trust does not operate
clearly to stratify wealth over time and could in fact have the opposite effect. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-63. At any rate, the federal Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax is now
the primary line of defense against intergenerational wealth concentrations, and further
modifications could be made to the tax to ensure adequate taxation of prolonged trusts. See
generally Ira Bloom, Transfer Tax Avoidance: The Impact of Perpetuities Restrictions Before
and After Generation-Skipping Taxation, 45 AL. L. REv. 261 (1981); Levin & Mulroney,
supra note 204; see also Snss, supra note 2, at 57; Leach, supra note 2, at 1136, 1141-42.
219. But see T.S. Eliot's Thomas Becket: "The last temptation is the greatest treason: To
do the right deed for the wrong reason." T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935).
220. Also, consider the possible substitute outlets for such vanity. Ezra Stiles, an early
president of Yale College, planned to bequeath funds for a literal, fifty-foot monument to
himself, "somewhat in Resemblance of the Ancyran Marble of Augustus Caesar." EDMUND
S. MORoAN, THE GENTLE PuPrTAN 164 (1962). On Stiles's estate plan, see id. at 163-65.
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even to inflexible instructions as to use 221 is one policy that merits attention.
Mere intuition suggests that a right to stipulate the use of property for
nearly a centurym is of doubtful social utility. In addition, the failure of
perpetuities law to distinguish trusts from legal estates in property appears
problematic on its face. Again, the prospect of land left underutilized for
close to a hundred years due to high transaction costs should suffice at
least to raise legislative eyebrows. On the other hand, flexibly drafted
discretionary trusts implicate none of the traditional justifications for tying
the dead hand. Trusts of this sort could be released even from existing
limits on the duration of future interests without disserving public policy.
In short, attention to the variations of dead hand control suggests that
in some respects perpetuities law needs tightening; in others it could be
looser still. But as of yet, lawmakers have failed to conceive of the problem
of future interests in qualitative terms. The whole area calls for fundamental
rethinking.m
That lawmakers have indeed neglected to think much or deeply about
future interests may be symptomatic of more rudimentary ills. What Dean
Gulliver called the "hero-worship of stare decisis"A has long infected this
body of law.22 The field remains notorious for its fealty to feudal formalisms

221. Likewise, inflexible conduct restrictions that modify the behavior of beneficiaries fit

into this category.

222. Under the Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities, future interests of all sorts are

permitted to endure for 90 years. See supra note 198. Under the common law Rule, their

endurance cannot be so precisely dated, but by the use of extraneous measuring lives similar
longevity is achievable. Dukeminier, Uniform Rule, supra note 4, at 1029-34.
223. One possible fundamental change of approach would be to set a more flexible, equitable
standard for the regulation of dead hand control. Lord Chancellor Nottingham had that in
mind in the seminal Duke of Norfolk's Case, when he ruled future interests invalid "whereever any visible Inconvenience doth appear; for the just Bounds of a Fee-simple upon a Feesimple are not yet determined." Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 (Ch. 1682).
Only later did this criterion of decision (as so often happens) harden into a rule of law. Yet,
in a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of Mississippi made noises that, remarkably, hark
back to Nottingham: the Court observed that "Our cases have not yet fleshed out the meaning
of our wait-and-see doctrine," and it refused to define "the outer limits of wait-and-see."
Throughout, the judges heaped scorn on Professor Gray's technical approach to the Rule,
insisting that "[w]e need not sacrifice civil justice on the altar of legal formalism or the
purist's nostalgia." In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423, 433 & n.20 (Miss. 1989). Quaere,
however, whether an equitable approach to perpetuities would impose too large a cost in terms
of increased uncertainty and litigation-breeding.
224. GULIrvER, supra note 2, at 12.
225. See generally id. at 1-14; Jesse Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property:A River
Foundat Last, 65 IowA L. Rnv. 151 (1979). The titles tell it all: W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTY
LAw INDicTD! OR Tam PEOPLE Vs. BLAcKsTo~N, KENT, GRAY, AND STARE DECISIS (Acc.SsORms: PoNTrIus PnAR mAND
x LAWS OF THE MEEs DaTHE PEasi S) (1967) (easily one

of the most audacious law books of all time); William F. Fratcher, Exorcise the Curse of
Reversionary Possibilities,28 J. Mo. B. 34 (1972); Wythe Holt, The Testator Who Gave Away
Less Than All He or She Had: Perversionsin the Law of Future Interests, 32 ALA. L. Rnv.
69 (1980); Taylor Mattis & David Schellenberg, The Doctrine of Worthier Title in Illinois:
Burying the Dead, 23 J. MARsHALL L. Ray. 81 (1989); Ronald Maudsley, Escaping the Tyranny
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and its reverence for aged, if not antediluvian, precedents. Commentaries
on the Rule against Perpetuities have been livelier than the opinions, but
even these have often missed the forest for the trees. Too many pages have
been filled with technical abstraction-driving many a poor soul to the
6
brink of distraction.
Of course, in veering away from substance, future interests law has
traveled a well-worn road. Overburdened judges have always found it easier
to subsume questions of policy within mechanical formulas, formulas that
can in turn lull subsequent judges into the comfortable assumption that
policies left unstated need no review. That, alas, is the path of least
resistance. What appears unusual, if not unique, about future interests law
is the extent to which some jurists have become fairly intimidated by the
prospect of change. Having spun out their webs of logic (or casuistry?),
lawmakers have hesitated thereafter to disturb them, lest they unravel before
their eyes. The image is, in its own way, an elegant one. William Blackstone
warned that "[t]he law of real property in this country is ...

now formed

into a fine artificial system, full of unseen connections and nice dependencies; and he that breaks one link in the chain, endangers the dissolution
of the whole." 227 Ostensibly "no blind admirer of the Rule against Perpetuities," John Chipman Gray nonetheless shuddered at the thought of
meddling with his predecessors' handiwork. Gray agreed that "[i]t is a
dangerous thing to make ... a radical change in a part of the law which
is concatenated with almost mathematical precision ....
In [1828] the

reviewers [in New York] undertook to remodel the Rule against Perpetuities,
and what a mess they made of it! "2 More recently still, Judge Learned
Hand paid homage to the delicate artistry of future interests law. "I am
quite aware that this is all largely [a] matter of words," Hand conceded,
"but so is much of the law of property; and unless we treat such formal
distinctions as real, that law will melt away and leave not a rack behind." 229

of Common Law Estates, 42 Mo. L. REv. 355 (1977); Nicholas L. White, Bringing Tennessee
into the Twentieth Century Re Possibilitiesof Reverter, Powers of Termination and Executory

Interests When Used as Land Control Devices, 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 555 (1985); Robert
R. Wright, Medieval Law in the Age of Space: Some "Rules of Property" in Arkansas, 22
ARK. L. REv. 248 (1968); Charles M. Agee, Jr., Note, Has Tennessee Abolished Its Ancient

Class Gift Doctrine or Only Modified It?, 7 MEm. ST. U. L. REv. 129 (1976). And so on.
226. No less of a devotee than Professor Leach could grow weary. He wondered aloud
whether "anyone ever read Gray through." Leach, supra note 10, at 638. But do we, the

"jurisprudish" physicians, also need to heal ourselves? See supra note 5.
227. Perrin v. Blake (Exch. 1772), reprintedin FRANCis HARGRAV, A COLLECTION OF TRACTs
RELATIVE To THE LAW OF ENGLAND 487, 498 (London 1787) (upholding the rule in Shelley's
Case (1581)). Discussing the Rule against Perpetuities in similarly apocalyptic terms at around
the same time, see Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 162 (Ch. 1799) (Buller, J.).

228. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 869-71, at 757. On Gray's contribution to the reification of
the Rule, see Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the Transformation
of PerpetuitiesLaw, 36 U. Mwss L. Rav. 439 (1982).
229. Commissioner v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 74 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1934)
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This is alarmism, pure and simple. 20 If history discloses anything, it is
the remarkable durability and adaptability of legal culture. 23' Rules come
and go; there is always something left behind. (And in that, too, one may
spy a certain elegance.) No less than other areas, the law of future interests
must be free to bend with the social breezes of a world that has buried (or
sought to bury) the forms of action along with decedent testators. Indeed,
only by obstructing such evolution could lawmakers, in the end, invite

trouble.
That the Rule against Perpetuities has in fact proven troublesome is no
great secret. Many have criticized the Rule for its caprice.32 2 We would
criticize it for its reductionism. At the end of the day, ours may not be the
more damning reproof. After all, legal scholars have discerned great virtues
in simplicity. 23 Still, being simple and being simplistic are two different
things.23 However lawmakers see fit to weigh such matters is, for present
(Hand, J., dissenting). Others have sounded less strident notes of caution. E.g., Swns, supra
note 2, at 71-72; Leach, supra note 14, at 748-49; Philip Mechem, Comment, Further Thoughts
on the Pennsylvania PerpetuitiesLegislation, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 965, 965-67, 983. But cf.
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960-61 (Ch. 1682).
230. Perhaps we raise a bugaboo here. See, once again, the delightfully irreverent opinion
in In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1989). Certainly, the state of future
interests law has much improved in recent decades. Nonetheless, we think the point worth
belaboring. Overall, courts (if not legislatures) still tend to cling to tradition in this areaeven when they recognize its inexpedience. As the Superior Court of Connecticut observed,
"exaltation of verbalism over substance has been criticized, but it is rigidly adhered to in the
legalistic sophistry which comprises much of the lore of future interests." Second Nat'l Bank
of New Haven v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 283 A.2d 226, 229 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971).
231. Nevertheless, there have been a few occasions in history when legal culture nearly
cracked. See, e.g., S.F.C. MiLsoM, His~roicA FoUNrATIONS or TH CoiON LAW 358-61
(1969) (discussing the disarray following abolition of trial by ordeal).
232. E.g., Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d at 433 n.22; 6 AamEaiA LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 86, at 16, 33-37; McGovEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 509; Snsus, supra note 2,
at 64-65, 70-71; Haskell, supra note 12, at 550; Leach, supra note 14, at 722; Scott, supra
note 45, at 639-42. This criticism has echoed for some time, for example, Charles Sweet, The
Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 18 Juasm. Rnv. 132, 155-58 (1906). The
Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities attends to the complaint, though some believe the
cure is worse than the disease. See Dukeminier, Uniform Rule, supra note 4.
233. See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Toward a Simplified System of Law, in LAw
AND THE AmmucAN FuTURE 143 (Murray L. Schwartz ed., 1976); Janice Toran, Tis a Gift
to Be Simple: Aesthetics and ProceduralReform, 89 Mcn. L. Rzv. 352 (1990). In connection
with the Rule against Perpetuities, see Sncms, supra note 2, at 100, 108-09; GRAY, supra note
2, § 782, at 716-17; Fellows, supra note 4, at 654-55; Leach, supra note 14, at 721-23. But
cf. Stake, supra note 131, at 756-59 (arguing that complexity with regard to the Rule is a
virtue per se); Dukeminier, Uniform Rule, supra note 4, at 1057 (same, on different grounds).
One "cost" of the Rule's complexity is the not infrequent tendency of courts to misapply it.
See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 4, at 59-62. It is often said that hard cases make bad law. As
judicial wrestling with the Rule illustrates, the maxim can be reversed: hard law makes bad
cases!
234. As Einstein put it, "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not more
so." Albert Einstein, quoted in BuRroN G. MAixmL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL SREET
210 (4th ed. 1985) (on Einstein, cf. Torah, supra note 233, at 352-53); see also supra note 14.
In connection with the Rule against Perpetuities, see Thomas L. Waterbury, Some Further
Thoughts on PerpetuitiesReform, 42 MiNN. L. Rav. 41, 58 (1957) ("[I]ntricacy can be justified
if necessary to the objectives of the rule .... ").
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purposes, beside the point. The thrust of this Article has been to broaden
the terms of the debate, by reconnoitering a flank of the future interests
problem that has remained all quiet for too long. A first step only-but
one that could provide the outline for a new strategy of assault against
"the dead hand of John Chipman Gray." ' 5

235. Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d at 430.

